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3 FOREWORD 
Foreword by the Rapporteur, Dr K.  MEYER-HORN 
The vision of DELORS as expressed in his Report appears to be turning into reality earlier than many people had 
expected. The DELORS Report, which was presented in April1989 by the Committee of Central Bank Governors 
and economists chaired by the President of the Commission of the European Communities, has set in motion 
a new train of  thought. It has also convinced politicians and put them into a position where they have to take action. 
EMU, and particularly the shape thereof, will now determine public discussions in line with the progress of nego-
tiations at the intergovernmental conference under the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies (first and second 
half of 1991 respectively). Economic and Monetary Union extends far beyond the Single Market to be achieved 
by 1993. It will have far-reaching consequences for both the economy and the social fabric, and hence for the 
public in general. EMU must therefore be discussed not only by specialists but also by the public at large. The 
implications of EMU must be widely known when the final vote is taken. In other words, ways have to be found 
of involving in the discussion not only parliaments-European, national and regional- but also economic and social 
groups, as represented in particular on the European Community's Economic and Social Committee. 
The Economic and Social Committee has adopted a detailed Opinion on the DELORS Report and rounded this 
off with an additional Opinion on the proposals submitted to the intergovernmental conference on economic and 
monetary union. 
The proposals made in this additional Opinion can be summarized as follows: 
- After the beginning of the third stage the ECU would be introduced as a common currency for all twelve Mem-
ber States. The value of the ECU already hardened by then, would be fixed on the day of its introduction by 
the  ESCB  on  the  basis  of  the  prevailing  exchange  rate  visvis  the  core  of  stable  currencies. 
-All  Member States would participate in the work of the European Central Bank System (itself responsible for 
regulating the ECU money supply and formulating a common monetary policy) and would be involved in the 
coordination of economic and budgetary policies. As was the case with the exchange-rate mechanism after 
its introduction in 1979, waivers could be provided for at the beginning of the third stage whereby the exchange 
rates of Member States failing to attain the requisite convergence would be allowed to go on fluctuating against 
the ECU. 
-The  Committee approves the idea that the European Central Bank should be autonomous whilst being obli-
ged to present a Report, and believes that both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Com-
.mittee should be able to hold a debate on the ECB's Annual Report. 
-The  European Central Bank should be responsible for daily intervention policy on the foreign-exchange mar-
kets, but within the framework of guidelines laid down by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers for 
a longer-term common exchange-rate policy visvis third currencies. 
- In order to intensify economic policy cooperation, the role of the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
(and hence the role of the European Commission) should be strengthened. The ECOFIN Council could become 
a counterpart to the ESCB in ensuring the parallelism of economic and monetary union." 
- The reform programmes of the structurally weaker Member States will need to receive support from the Com-
munity, and be taken into account in the common economic policy guidelines, if these countries are to attain 
the requisite convergence. 
-In  the interests of greater convergence, broad-based economic policy making and the public support thereof, 
the Economic and Social Committee should be consulted whenever economic policy guidelines are drawn up. 
It should also be consulted on the country reports forming the basis of multilateral surveillance. 
-The  multilateral surveillance of economic and budgetary policies should encompass developments on the 
finance markets, including relations with capital markets outside the Community. In addition to the monito-
ring of the financing of budget deficits, an appropriate budgetary stance should also be defined for the Com-
munity as a whole. 
5 -The  particular concern of thisOpinion is to ensure that economic and monetary union can be achieved without 
the need for a two-speed Europe. The simultaneous introduction of the ECU in all twelve Member States during 
the third stage might well further this objective. The European economic area envisaged by the EEC together 
with EFTA, and perhaps even the East European countries, might also draw benefit from the existence of the 
ECU which would gradually develop into a key European currency and be accepted throughout Europe. 
An issue closely linked to the projected monetary union is the further development of  a European payment system. 
This subject was dealt with in a Discussion Paper presented by the EC Commission in September 1990.1n its Opi-
nion on the Discussion Paper, the Committee drew attention to the justified concerns ofpayments systems users 
-consumers and business undertakings, in particular small and medium-sized undertakings-as regards not only 
the transaction times and costs of international payments, but also the questions of legal security and liability 
for misdirected or non-executed payment orders. There are four matters of concern to the economic and social 
interest groups represented on the ESC. These points are as follows: 
- There should not be just one international payment system in the Community: users should have the choice 
between several payment systems in which credit institutions and groups of banks compete with one another. 
- Efforts should be made to acquaint users with the particular features and costs of the various individual types 
of payment so that they can choose the one which is most advantageous; credit institutions and consumer 
associations could help to provide users with appropriate information. 
- Cooperation between the credit institutions participating in the European payments systems should be in accor-
dance with the provisions on competition set out in Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
-Improvements should be made to the telecommunications infrastructure in the light of the expected exten-
sion of payment services and the increase in data transfers. 
In this Opinion, too, the Committee puts forward a series of proposals for debate. These proposals include: the 
introduction of an ombudsman at EC level to deal with disputes in respect of payments; the extension of the ECU-
clearing system, particularly in respect of ECU cheques; and the inclusion in the Eurocheque clearing system 
of Eurocheques for sums above the current ceiling. 
Experience with the first stage of EMU beginning in mid-1990 has involved closer cooperation between Central 
Bank Governors in their Joint Committee and the multilateral surveillance of the convergence of economic poti-
cies. The ESC has likewise taken a stand on the relevant procedures involved therein and this has made its Opi-
nion on the DELORS Report even more complete. 
The four ESC Opinions printed in this brochure, and the arguments of the economic and social groups represen-
ted on the Committee, are a contribution to the debate on the shape of Economic and Monetary Union. 
The crucial question in policy-formation is whether a high level of  economic and social convergence can be achie-
ved simultaneously. The ESC is of  the view that economic and social developments (which are closely knit) must 
keep step with monetary integration in all countries of the European Community. In advancing towards econo-
mic and monetary union, careful attention must therefore also be paid to the social dimension. 
6· OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on the 
Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community 
(DELORS Report) 
7 PROCEDURE 
On 30 May 1989 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the  fourth paragraph of  Article  20 of  the A  ules 
of Procedure, decided to draw up an Opinion on the 
Report on economic and monetary union in the Community (DELORS Report). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's 
work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 10 October 1989. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 270th Plenary Session (meeting of 19 October 1989) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion by 111  votes to six with four abstentions: 
*  *  * 
1.  Causes, Conditions and Benefits of EMU 
1 . 1 .  Economic and Monetary Union is described as a realistic target in the Report which was presented 
on 12 April1989 by the committee of central bank governors and economists chaired by the President 
of the Commission of the European Communities, Jacques DELORS, in accordance with the terms 
of reference issued by the European Council in Hanover on 27-28 June 1988. 
1 . 2 .  The conditions for the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union are better now  than they were 
at the time of the WERNER plan (Council Decision of 22 March 1971) or of the establishment of the 
European Monetary System (Council Resolution of 13 March 1979), which has never moved on to 
stage two: 
- Economic and Monetary Union will supplement the internal market which is to be established by 
1 January 1993 under the terms of  the Single European Act. The advantages of  the internal market 
will be felt in the monetary sector, too; as a matter of fact, monetary union is even a key feature 
of a Community-wide internal market. 
- A single monetary area would also be a logical sequel to the plan for liberalizing capital movements 
by 1 July 1990 (even if  transitional rules are to apply unti11993 for Ireland and Greece and until1992 
for Spain and Portugal), and to the lifting of  all restrictions on banking under the terms of  the Second 
Directive on the coordination of banking legislation. 
- The prerequisites for Economic and Monetary Union have improved because the gaps between 
inflation rates have narrowed and economic policies have converged more, thanks to the closer 
cooperation betwenn central bank governors and Economic and Finance Ministers. 
1 . 3 .  Given the objectives listed in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty and the fact that the arguments put forward 
in the first chapter of the DELORS Report are to be endorsed, it would seem advisable and realistic 
to move towards Economic and Monetary Union. In so doing it will be possible to build on the good 
record of  cooperation within the European Monetary System. Approval is given to the view (in point 
5) that the EMS has succeeded as a zone of relative price and exchange-rate stability, though this 
success has also been due to the particularly favourable economic and monetary climate in recent years. 
1 . 4 .  The key to progress towards Economic and Monetary Union will be political will and readiness to make 
the requisite institutional arrangements. The Madrid European Council's decision of  27 June to launch 
the first phase of EMU on 1 June 1990 as proposed in point 43 of  the Report is obviously not  yet regarded 
in all Member States as a clear political commitment to  a fully-fledged monetary union, i.e. as a "decision 
to embark on the entire process" as the DELORS Report states in point 39. On the other hand, some 
progress will be made in the monetary sector in the run-up to 1992 thanks to the liberalization of  capital 
movements and financial services and the coordination of banking supervision. 
However, the question of how the transfer of economic and monetary powers to the Community is 
viewed is still all-important for the broad political approval needed by EMU. One difficulty here is that 
9 1. 4. 1. 
1 .4.2. 
1. 4.3. 
1. 5. 
10 
the Community bodies have not yet discussed to what extent irrevocable exchange rates or even a 
single Community currency will make it necessary to transfer powers and decision-making to the 
Community. The extent of this transfer of powers to Community bodies (such as the Council of 
Ministers and the European System of Central Banks) is of  key importance for  the political endorsement 
of Economic and Monetary Union and should therefore be agreed on before a binding decision is 
reached on the final stage of  EMU. The discussions should also cover the alternatives to the DELORS 
Report which have been given a public airing in the meantime but which are not considered by the 
Committee in this Opinion. 
Many more powers are to be transferred under the DELORS Report's proposals than under the Single 
European Act in the run-up to 1992. Political concern about the surrender of powers to  joint Community 
decision-making bodies is therefore understandable. Economic constraints by themselves will not 
ensure requisite political will. It is true to say that the scope for independent monetary and economic 
policymaking will be reduced if Member States' economies and capital markets merge more closely, 
as explained in points 10 and 12 of the Report. 
However, it was- and still is- possible for Member States to shield their economies to some extent 
by adjusting their exchange rates. In the last two-and-a-half years this possibility has deliberately not 
been used in the EMS. During the preparations for EMU it will be vital to seize on the opportunity still 
existing to change exchange rate parities (point 12), within the framework of Community arrange-
ments, especially under the growing constraints of  the internal market with its free movement of  capital 
and unrestricted banking services and especially when all Member States are full members of  the EMS. 
Political understanding for  the fact that the structural adjustments required during the transitional period 
can be made easier by parity changes is a sine qua non for endorsement of the transfer of decision-
making to Community bodies which irrevocable and firmly fixed exchange rates will require. On the 
other hand, although the existence of  a common economic and monetary policy will reduce national 
control over policy, the Member States acting together will normally have more economic and monetary 
scope. 
The willingness of policymakers at all levels to bow to economic constraints and approve the surrender 
of  sovereignty needed for Economic and Monetary Union will not fit in easily with a three-stage plan, 
even if no deadlines are fixed for these stages. However, a target date, such as the year 2000, might 
facilitate decision making and taking. The fact that the 1992 deadline for the internal market is working 
well is evidence of  this. In addition, the hitherto mainly academic discussion should be extended and 
action taken generally to promote the political willingness to accept EMU. Above all, the public should 
be made aware of the need for EMU, with all its benefits and consequences. 
An early date, if  possible in the second half of 1990, should be set for the intergovernmenal conference 
for drafting an EMU Treaty which was proposed in the DELORS Report and accepted at the Madrid 
Summit. This conference should not be held in full secrecy throughout; a suitable way of briefing 
parliaments- European, national and regional- should be found. These briefings and discussions should 
include economic and social groups, as  represented in particular on the European Community's 
Economic and Social Committee, which should be consulted regularly on further developments. 
Economic and Monetary Union extends far beyond the internal market and has far-reaching conse-
quences for the economy and the social fabric and thus for the public in general. The implications 
of EMU must be broadly known when the final vote is taken, because such a vote will be tantamount 
in its importance to a Community-wide referendum. In view of these implications, the powers of the 
European Parliament must be strengthened as soon as possible in preparation for the democratic policy-
forming, decision-taking and  supervisory  role it  will be assigned in EMU. The changeover to EMU would 
be made easier if the European  Parliament cooperated more closely with national and regional 
parliaments. 
Because of the desire to seek broad political approval for EMU, it would be advisable to agree on its 
consequences as soon as possible and incorporate all the main decisions required for the completion 
of EMU in a single Treaty. In addition, the path towards EMU described in the DELORS Report could 
be underpinned by an action programme - basic social rights, tax harmonization, regional policy-to 
be proposed by the Commission (as in the 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market). 1. 5. 1. 
1. 5.2. 
1. 6. 
1. 6. 1. 
1. 6.2. 
1. 7. 
It  would not be important for the measures adopted on the basis of  such a programme to be assigned 
to one of the stages described in the DELORS Report. Instead they should accompany the run-up 
to 1992 and be in response to how this run-up fares,  especially after the liberalization of capital 
movements, the establishment of freedom to supply banking and financial services, the inclusion of 
all Community currencies in the EMS's exchange rate mechanism and the changing of  taxation. Since 
these events will mean radical changes in many Member States and could widen existing gaps in 
development still further, there is a case for accompanying Community measures (see point 2.8. et 
seq.). 
The four aspects -liberalization of  capital movements, freedom to supply financial services, the EMS's 
exchange rate mechanism and changes in taxation- could prove to be the acid testfor EMU, and require 
considerable adjustments to exchange rates. Unlike the last two-and-a-half years when EMS exchange 
rates have undergone no adjustments, the possibility for making parity changes (coordinated at 
Community level) would have to be exploited in good time and to the requisite extent during this period 
of  adjustment. Such parity changes would not endanger progress towards EMU-they would in fact 
establish a favourable basis. 
It will be important, for the sake of the political will and the public understanding which ought to be 
fostered (especially among economic and social groups, trade associations and the two sides of 
industry), to go into more detail than the DELORS Report does about the consequences of EMU. The 
real benefits:. and constraints- of EMU are.simply touched on in the DELORS Report (e.g. point 14 
-significant increase in "economic welfare"). 
The cost and benefits of EMU have not been calculated in the way "non-Europe" was casted in the 
CECCHINI Report on the internal market. It would, however, be useful to make some mention of the 
magnitude of the savings that will be made, as  President DELORS  announced to the European 
Parliament in September 1989. The benefits of monetary union will be felt throughout the economy, 
as  described in  points 2.9. et seq  below.  In a monetary union, and especially if there is a single 
Community currency, the man in the street will probably identify himself more closely with Europe, 
and even though this closer identification cannot be quantified it will be welcome for the sake of 
integration.  Households and  small  firms are among those who will benefit financially from the 
elimination of exchange-rate risks and- if a single currency is introduced- from the disappearance 
of  exchange costs, the simplification of payment transactions and not least the greater price transpa-
rency which is so important for competition. 
On the other hand, the constraints of EMU should not be concealed from the public. These constraints 
are referred to in the DELORS Report under the headings "parallelism", "subsidiarity", "plurality" 
and "solidarity" but  they are not  dealt with in any great detail. In particular there should be a thorough, 
frank discussion of the consequences of  establishing a sound basis for price stability, of not allowing 
the central banks to engage in inflationary deficit financing by providing unlimited loans, and of  securing 
transfer payments from regional and structural funds. It will also be necessary, apart from adopting 
economic policy measures, to make several exchange-rate adjustments if  the differences-still consid-
erable in some cases- between individual countries' tax structures and budgetary balances and between 
their social security costs and the funding thereof are to be eliminated or at least reduced before the 
launch of EMU. 
The Economic and Social Committee draws attention to the manifold consequences of the requisite 
adjustments and structural changes in its comments below on the final stage of  Economic and Monetary 
Union (Chapter 2) and on the steps towards that Union (Chapter 3). The Committee believes that the 
DELORS  Report  does  not give sufficient consideration  to the various social  aspects of these 
adjustments and structural changes, and trusts that the social dimension of Economic and Monetary 
Union will be carefully examined in the course of  the further preparations. The purpose of  this cannot 
be to encroach on the autonomy of  the collective-bargaining partners (point 30 of  the DELORS Report) 
or to lay down a Community blueprint for  wage policy which goes further than simple guidelines such 
as a reference to real productivity gains. Wage policies which are based on real improvements in produc-
tivity and which also lead to real increases in income would indeed make a major contribution towards 
safeguarding price stability in Economic and Monetary Union, and would also be of particular benefit 
11 to the economically less developed areas of  the Community where there are considerable productivity 
reserves. These areas would have a better chance with such a policy (than with the infiationary policy 
pursued to date) of catching up with the incomes in the rest of the Community and making social 
progress. According to the Economic and Social Committee it  is vital that economic and social develop-
ments throughout the Community - which, as it is, are closely knit - keep pace with economic and 
monetary integration and that workers have trust in the Community. The Economic and  Social 
Committee would therefore stress once again that in its view Economic and Monetary Union is only 
conceivable if a high degree of economic and social convergence is attained. 
2.  The Final Stage of EMU 
2 . 1 .  The old dispute between "monetarists" and "economists" on whether economic union is an inevitable 
consequence of monetary union or merely its culmination has not been fully laid to rest in the DELORS 
Report. The parallel implementation of  economic union and monetary union is advocated in point  21. 
However, the Report rightly admits in point 42 that "temporary deviations from parallelism" cannot 
be avoided and are indeed "part of the dynamic process of the Community". Be this as it may, the 
Committee agrees with the DELORS  Report that parallelism means that the principal features of 
economic union are influenced by the agreed monetary arrangements and constraints, but equally 
that monetary union is only conceivable if it goes hand-in-hand with a high degree of economic 
convergence. 
2. 1. 1. 
2.1 .2. 
2.1 .3. 
12 
Monetary integration must and can be to the fore if  it  is decided to set up a European System of  Central 
Banks- ESCB- (point32) with a mandate fora common monetary policy (point24). On the other hand, 
individual Member States should rightly be entitled to retain a certain degree of autonomy in their 
economic decision-making. This degree of autonomy, which still has to be agreed on, would satisfy 
the principle of subsidiarity and would ensure that Member States retain their identity and plurality 
(economic, social, cultural, political - point 17) as they should.  Basically it is more a question of 
enhancing the political will to act jointly and not so much one of creating new institutions as soon 
as possible. 
Unlike the monetary sector, no new Community body would be created for economic policy decisions. 
Powers would be allocated in accordance with the "principle of  subsidiarity'' (point 20). The Council 
of Ministers would determine the broad lines of economic policy (point 33) but the Member States 
would remain responsible for decisions which can be carried out at national, regional and local level 
without having adverse repercussions on the cohesion and operation of EMU. Before this principle 
can be put into practice in all economic and social sectors, there will have to be close legally sanctioned 
agreement between the Member States. Experiences show that even in a federation such as the USA 
there is considerable scope for political decision-taking without  this leading to economic or monetary 
disintegration. 
It will be difficult for the common monetary p9licy and a convergent economic policy to advance in 
parallel as long as they are the responsibility of bodies which are not committed solely to Europe in 
their composition. As an indication of the lack of parallelism tensions may arise between monetary 
policy on the one hand and economic and fiscal policies on the other. Another reason why  parallelism 
is difficult to achieve is that the responsibilities for (a) monetary policy and (b) economic and fiscal 
policies differ from country to country. The more economic policy in general is in tune with the price 
stability objective, the easier it will be to achieve parallelism at Community level. 
The basis for a common monetary policy, as  required by irrevocably fixed exchange rates and -
ultimately-a common currency (point 16), is the mandate assigned to this policy. Here the DELORS 
Report mentions first and foremost (point 32) the commitment to price stability and support for the 
general economic policy set at Community level. Community and national economic and fiscal policies 
will have to be in tune with the price stability objective. 
It is vital in connection with monetary policy to supervise the entire supply of money and credit and 
ensure that there is an efficient system of payments and finance, including electronic payment systems. 
By contrast, the issuing and circulation of banknotes and coins is no longer as important as it once 2.2.1. 
2.2.2. 
2.2.3. 
2.2.4. 
was. Therefore, the DELORS Report has not been negligent - despite public speculation - in failing 
to submit any proposals about what form Community banknotes and coins should take. 
The key role to be played by price stability should be embodied in the ESCB's statute in accordance 
with the DELORS Report's proposals (point 32). Price stability is important for a number of reasons: 
- Price stability is an important, albeit not  the only, prerequisite for economic growth and a low  level 
of unemployment. 
- If price stability is guaranteed to the same extent throughout the Community, a major incentive 
for speculation on currency revaluations and devaluations will be lost. 
- Stable currency relations within the Community will help considerably to make the Community into 
an attractive capital market worldwide. 
The commitment to price stability will also be of great social benefit because the savings and earnings 
of less-privileged groups will not be eroded by inflation. EMU will thus contribute something to the 
social dimension which many still find lacking in the internal market. 
If monetary depreciation can be minimized, small savers and persons receiving state pensions will not 
suffer socially questionable losses in purchasing power. Collective bargaining will also be made easier 
since "compensation for inflation" will no longer have to be included in wage negotiations, and all 
countries of  the Community will become equally attractive targets for investment capital. A monetary 
union committed to price stability will thus make it easier for the Community to raise capital on the 
international  markets for structural and  regional  development projects.  It would also  help  the 
Community to  face up better to the currencies which have dominated the international monetary system 
in the past (in particular the US dollar), and to fight the importing of inflation (cf points 2.9.1. and 
2.9.2. ), although even monetary union in the Community cannot of course provide complete protection 
from all the upheavals caused by the international monetary system. 
The EMS's good track record militates in favour of  the political acceptance of  a Community committed 
to stability. As the DELORS Report quite rightly points out, the EMS has given increasing priority to 
price stability and has benefited from the role played by the Deutschmark as an "anchor" for partici-
pants' monetary policies. A large core of countries with low inflation rates has now emerged within 
the  EMS  and  criticism  about  "skewed  exchange-rate  adjustments"  and  the  Deutschmark's 
"dominance" has subsided, especially as the Deutschmark, too, is seriously affected by international 
monetary constraints. A monetary union, giving a Community basis to the responsibilities and policy-
forming processes which have often been guided by decisions of  the German Bundesbank in the past, 
will offer the chance to progress still further here. The lessons learnt from the EMS will make it easier 
to find a solution at Community level to the tensions which may arise if support for a policy geared 
to balanced growth, converging standards of living, high employment and external equilibrium is to 
coincide with greater price stability (point 16). This will require agreement at Community level on this 
list of economic objectives and -even more so- on joint priorities. The decisions to be taken here by 
the bodies responsible for economic policy must be based on analyses of  each individual case. Special 
care must be taken to ensure that Community priorities are taken into consideration in the areas of 
economic and fiscal policy still the responsibility of national authorities. 
The use of monetary policy to support economic policy is regarded in some quarters as the Achilles 
heel of modern central banks, particularly when exchange-rate policy is used as a means of  safeguarding 
external balances. The DELORS Report is not clear about who is to be responsible for exchange-rate 
policy, which even in countries with a "modern" constitution is by no means the sole responsibility 
of the central bank. Thus, while point 32 states that the ESCB is to be responsible for exchange-rate 
management, point 33 talks about formulating the Community's exchange-rate policy in cooperation 
with the ESCB Council and point 60 talks about exchange-market interventions in third currencies 
being the sole responsibility of  the ESCB Council in accordance with Community exchange-rate policy. 
However, because of their economic consequences, and in particular because of the effect they have 
on structural policy, changes in exchange rates cannot be justified solely on monetary-policy grounds. 
13 2.2.5. 
2.2.6. 
2.3. 
2.3.1. 
2.3.2. 
2.4. 
2.4.1. 
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The intergovernmental negotiations on the EMU Treaty or on the ESCB statute must therefore specify 
which body is to be responsible for the Community's exchange-rate policy towards third country 
currencies- for example, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers-and how cooperation with 
the ESCB will function. It must be stated clearly here that decisions about exchange-rate changes 
vis-a-vis third countries should not have an adverse effect on the ESCB's policy as regards price stability. 
In an EMU with irrevocably fixed parities or even a single currency, the exchange-rate policy to be 
adopted towards third countries may be determined more by market influences and fundamental factors 
(e.g. greater differences in productivity) than in the past in individual Community countries, which 
- especially during the early years of the EMS - used this policy instrument to balance out divergent 
trends in income, growth and inflation. 
The European System of Central Banks should be involved in the coordination of  banking supervision 
policies, instead of a special body being set up for this purpose. However, this task should be kept 
separate from monetary policy's task. On no account should the ESCB take over a central supervisory 
role for the Community's banking sector, similar to that performed by  the Bank of England in the UK. 
On the premise that it is the home authorities' responsibility (subsidiarity principle), this supervision 
should be left to  the national bodies which scrutinize the Community-wide activites of  nationally licensed 
credit and financial institutions. The mutual recognition of  banking supervision, the principle of which 
is to be confirmed in the Second Banking Directive after the alignment of minimum standards, will 
make it  possible to relieve the ESCB of  any direct supervisory duties and merely entrust it  with coordi-
nating duties. 
The ESCB's statute must be tailored to the particularly difficult and unprecedented mandate of a 
common monetary policy for twelve countries. The European Parliament must be involved in the 
drafting of  the statute. The most important rules will concern the ESCB's federal structure and indepen-
dence (point 32). 
The logic behind the ESCB's federal structure is that national central banks should continue to be legally 
independent and should not merge to form a Community central bank. In view of the Community's 
diversity this is the correct logic. The ESCB's federal structure will mean that the governors of the 
central banks will form the ESCB Council, together with the members of  the Board appointed by the 
European Council; such a structure will not hinder the adoption and implementation of  joint monetary-
policy decisions by the ESCB. 
Since monetary policy cannot be decided federally and regionally, the ESCB should operate only at 
one level with regard to the taking of  decisions and their implementation. This is the way other central 
banks with a federal system operate, such as the US Federal Reserve System. In the USA the twelve 
regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are responsible for the 52 US States, implement the common 
policy determined by the Federal Reserve Board and do not have different central banking policies 
of their own, and likewise the Community countries' central banks would be the ESCB's executive 
organs. The ESCB Council could transfer important tasks such as open market operations or inter-
vention on the money or  foreign-currency markets to some-or  even all-of  the central banks. However, 
the statute must ensure that in the final stage of EMU the national central banks are bound by the 
ESCB's instructions in all instances. 
In the interest of  a stability-oriented monetary policy, the ESCB must, in the performance of  its duties, 
not be bound by  instructions from national governments or Community bodies (point 32). This indepen-
dence is required in particular for the task of safeguarding price stability within the framework of  the 
ESCB's sole responsibility for the common monetary policy in the EMU. One factor restricting this 
independence is that the ESCB -like the German Bundesbank under Article 12 of its statute- must 
support general Community economic policy, though not each individual measure, provided that this 
does not conflict with the objective of  safeguarding price stability. The cooperation needed to  support 
economic policy could involve participation, without the power to vote, in discussions of the ESCB 
Council, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers and the Commission (point 34). 
Apart from its functional independence, the legal and financial independence of  the ESCB should be 
embodied in its statute. The political independence of  the ESCB Council's members will be safeguarded 2.4.2. 
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in particular by the fact that the chairman and the members of  the Board will have appropriate security 
of  tenure, e.g. twice the length of the EC Commissioners' terms (point 32). The nominations should 
be made by the Council of Ministers acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament. The Member States should be left to decide the terms of the central bank 
governors and their appointments to the ESCB Council in accordance with national practices. 
In view of  the - albeit desirable - powers of a future Community monetary body, the ESCB should be 
answerable in keeping with normal democratic practice. It should report not only to the Council of 
Ministers but also - at least once a year - to the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee. This accountability  should not lead to any interference in the ESCB's ongoing business, 
but it  should make some form of democratic scrutiny possible. Any disputes could be brought before 
the European Court of Justice. 
It is only logical that the national central banks and their working bodies should enjoy the same indepen-
dence as the ESCB  (point 52). 
The ESCB Council should take decisions by a majority, and not a unanimous, vote. A purely political 
and rather rigid weighting of  votes such as in the Council of Ministers or in the European Parliament 
or Economic and Social Committee, where the seats are allocated country by country, is not the only 
method which could be used. Monetary or economic weighting criteria could also be taken into consi-
deration. 
In the monetary union, a Community-wide body-the ESCB-will be responsible for monetary policy, 
but in the absence of a democratically appointed Community government, economic union will have 
no comparable body to lay down common policy guidelines. 
It  would be feasible - without the role of the EC Commission being changed and pending an increase 
in  the European  Parliament's powers- for the Council of Economic and  Finance Ministers to be 
entrusted with temporary economic policymaking powers on the basis of Articles 102a, 104 and 105 
of the EEC Treaty. 
The powers of the Council of Ministers would have to go further than the 18 February 1974 decision 
on the convergence of economic policy, which would have to be amplified considerably as the EC 
Commission proposed on 20 September. For example, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
ought to agree on important economic policy targets based on a review of economic developments 
(Annual Economic Report) and a statement on medium-term budget intentions. It should be borne 
in mind here that the Council of Ministers, by virtue of its make-up, is prevented from running the 
Community economy on a day-to-day basis. The fate of the 1974 convergence decision has shown 
that ministers tied  by national  government responsibilities  will  be  overtaxed  as  members of a 
Community-wide body where economic policy decisions have to be taken frequently. 
The broad lines of the Community's economic and monetary policy should be determined more by 
Community-wide considerations provided that this is compatible with the principle of  subsidiarity. In 
this way not only will monetary policy be put on a Community-wide footing, but the Community's 
economic policy will gradually acquire a degree of independence. This would appear to be necessary 
for the sake of greater convergence and if new imbalances are to be averted, especially in the event 
of an economic crisis. The Commission should therefore consider how economic policy can also be 
given some degree of independence in an Economic and Monetary Union. 
It would, however, be undesirable to interfere directly in individual areas of national economic and 
social policy, e.g. the level of State aid in, say, the housing and social sectors and decisions on what 
shares of government budgets and social security and pension funds are to come from direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and social-security contributions. All the same, care should be taken to ensure that the 
individual areas of  economic, social and fiscal policy which remain the Member States' responsibility 
are generally compatible with the macroeconomic framework established at Community level so that 
the convergence of economic policy as a whole is secure. 
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However, there should be one important exception in the field of  budgetary  policy  to the rule that there 
should be no direct interference in national economic and fiscal policies. In order not to thwart the 
common monetary policy geared to stability, the inflationary financing of budget deficits must not 
be allowed. Accordingly, there must be no inflationary financing of budget deficits (local, regional, 
national or Community) by unlimited use, either directly or indirectly, of central banks loans. The 
comments made on this matter in the DELORS Report (point 33) are endorsed. Community ex-ante 
coordination in the form of binding rules for upper limits on budget deficits and the definition of 
aggregate budgetary balances does not seem to be necessary. The adoption of such ex-ante rules 
by the Council of Ministers would be  in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity and the basic 
democratic budgetary rights of  the Member State parliaments. Nevertheless public and social budgets 
have a significant influence on Member States' economic and social policies. They affect hundreds 
of  thousands of  jobs throughout Europe, they influence individual Member States' wage policies and 
they determine the level and quality of a large number of community services. Full-scale budgetary-
policy cooperation is therefore needed to ensure that existing imbalances do not deteriorate any further. 
The rule that there should be no direct interference in budgetary policy does not rule out efforts to 
ensure that budgets comply with the stability objective, as part of  the general coordination of  economic 
and fiscal policies (see 2.5.2.). It  should be added that, in an EMU, Member States' budgetary policies 
will be under greater pressure to obey the constraints of (i) a common monetary policy geared to stability 
and (ii) central banks' inability to resort to deficit-financing. 
After  the completion of  EMU it  will no longer be possible for Member States to regain their competiti-
veness and the economic advantages of  their geographical locations by  adjusting their exchange rates. 
Prosperity in the Community, as measured in terms of per-capita income, still varies by as much as 
6:1  between the richer and the poorer regions, and this gap will be even more obvious in a single 
monetary area. For then wages and salaries as well as prices (and purchasing power) will be able to 
be compared in the same currency in all Member States. 
In the past balances of payments have been determined by economic and monetary policies (more 
successful in some cases than in others) and by  economic performance. The wrong conclusions should 
not be drawn here for a future Economic and Monetary Union, which cannot be expected per se to 
eliminate national and regional income differentials; for a common currency would in itself still not 
constitute a commitment to reduce differences in prosperity-even though it  would make them more 
obvious - or even to fully replace the balances of payments used so far with revenue equalization 
payments from the Community budget. 
Even in an Economic and Monetary Union the reduction of competitive differences and variations in 
prosperity will require structural adjustments - which will leave their mark on regional employment 
and growth. The Community is obliged by  Article 130a of  the EEC Treaty to  strengthen "its  economic 
and social cohesion" with a particular view to reducing disparities between regions. For this purpose 
the European Council decided in February 1988 that the structural funds were to be doubled by 1993, 
that there was to be a shift in emphasis from project to programme financing and that a new form 
of  partnership was to be established between the Community and its less developed regions. Approval 
is given to the DELORS Report's view (point 29) that the principal objective of regional policy should 
be not to subsidize incomes and simply offset inequalities in standards of living but- with the aid of 
investment programmes for, say, improving infrastructure- to prevent the large-scale migration of 
labour from becoming the major adjustment factor. 
On the other hand, the DELORS Report also considers it necessary (point 59) to further strengthen 
Community structural and regional policies"  adapted to  the needs of  the economic and monetary union" 
and to supplement structural transfers to Member States. These "needs" will stem in particular from 
the adjustment difficulties which may occur at  the start when it  is no longer possible to fund economic 
and budget measures by inflationary financing and offset the consequences by devaluing against the 
currencies of neighbouring countries. 
Monetary union will require the abandonment of inflationary economic and fiscal policies, but this 
cannot be "rewarded" by  simply introducing equalization payments. The European Community, which 2.8. 
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even with Economic and Monetary Union will be a long way from being a federation, would be 
overtaxed by such transfers between Member States of equalization payments not earmarked for a 
specific purpose: 
- financially, such payments between twelve countries would exceed the Community budget, and 
- politically, it would not be possible to push through such supranational payments as  long as 
budgetary and fiscal policies remain a national responsibility. 
The dispute that might very well break out on the subject of transfer payments not earmarked for a 
specific purpose would be much more of  a burden to the Community than the negotiations about the 
reform of the CAP or the increase in own resources, and might even leave a permanent scar. 
Simple transfer payments for no specific purpose or some form of equalization payments from one 
state to another as mentioned in 2. 7  .4. are not the solution to the considerable structural adjustment 
problems that will have to be tackled. Because these adjustments will be far-reaching, a suitable way 
of making them easier to bear will have to be found. Above all, these adjustments should not be made 
at  the expense of  the most underprivileged groups and regions. It  is therefore regretted that the DELORS 
Report  has  made  no practical  proposals about the support measures  required  to lessen  these 
adjustments' impact on such groups and regions. 
The EC structural funds will have to be considerably increased still further after 1993 in the run-up to 
EMU. However, the payments therefrom should not be akin to revenue equalization payments. Instead 
they should be deployed within the framework of  a European structural  and  regional policy, if  possible 
in such a way (point 29) that the recipients are prompted to make major efforts to adjust. These efforts 
would have to fit in with jointly-agreed Community objectives and would thus contribute to the sought-
after economic and social cohesion in the Community. 
The development of infrastructure and measures for improving occupational skills are particularly 
urgent, given the necessary adjustments to exchange rates still possible initially. Unless there is some 
alignment of the factors determining the location of industry, wage and social policies will be overs-
tretched in their efforts to give workers and underprivileged groups a share of  economic growth, which 
will include ensuring minimum social standards throughout the Community.  Unfortunately, the 
DELORS Report fails to mention the effect of EMU on national systems of social security. 
The comments on wage policy in the Report are welcomed insofar as they expressly confirm the 
autonomy of  the parties to wage agreements. The recommendation (point 30) that wage policy should 
be geared to improvements in productivity is regarded as a non-binding policy guideline. The Economic 
and Monetary Union's price stability target would benefit from the use of  (real) improvements in produc-
tivity as such a guideline, without this ruling out special demands with regard to wages and wealth 
distribution. Furthermore, regardless of  the provision of resources from EC funds, some room should 
be left for national structural and regional policies, though naturally with due regard to Community 
competition rules and in particular the ban on selective aid. 
As for the rest, some improvement for the structurally disadvantaged and economically backward 
regions can be expected from the capital market of an EMU. Thanks to the monetary union and the 
abolition of restrictions on capital movements, all EC Member States will have equal access to the 
"European financial area" and an important reason for the discrimination against the "soft-currency" 
countries caused by  the international-rating standard will be eliminated. By having access to the capital 
market, possibly at interest rates still varying from region to region, the less-favoured areas will become 
more attractive for private investors so that their comparative cost advantages and differences in 
purchasing power can be exploited to a greater degree. This will make it possible to use the EC funds 
to a greater extent for capital and interest subsidies, particularly with the participation of regional credit 
institutions, so that more resources can be mobilized for projects contributing to the development 
of less-developed areas. 
Thanks to the monetary union the chances for  the less-favoured regions of  the Community will improve 
on the whole, albeit not in the same way for all or by any means automatically, and the Community 
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in general will most certainly profit internationally. An almost continental market, in which there are 
no exchange risks, which will later even have a common currency, in which bank and financial services 
can be freely provided and in which there are no restrictions on capital movements-such a European 
financial area will be an attractive location for investors from third countries. Not only would more 
money  from the rest of  the world be attracted to  the European financial area but  also Community savings 
would be invested more in the Community itself. 
Economic and Monetary Union would give the Community greater clout internationally. The ECU would 
be able to compete better with the dollar and the yen, as an investment and reserve currency, than 
any European currency today. A Community speaking with one voice could play a greater role (and 
a role that really befits Europe) in the world monetary system, in international organizations such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and in other groups such as the G7 (and a future 
G4?). 
The ECU would be increasingly used as an invoicing currency internationally, thereby strengthening 
the Community's position in world trade. Price quotations and contracts for oil, raw materials and 
technological products would no longer be exclusively in dollars. The at times extreme volatility of 
these prices, aggravated by  fluctuations in the exchange rate of  the dollar, has over the last two decades 
been very detrimental to the Community economy- not least in the energy sector, the CAP and the 
aircraft industry. 
The  role that the ECU  would over time assume  here would bring immeasurable benefit to the 
Community. Monetary union would thus have a "usefulness" extending far beyond the abovemen-
tioned savings in exchange costs and in payment  transactions. On the other hand, the risks associated 
with the circulation of large volumes of ECUs should not be underestimated. The types of upheavals 
which might be caused have been seen on the Eurodollar market. 
The importance and also the responsibilities of the Community at world level would increase not  just 
in monetary terms but also in economic terms. The international role of the Community mentioned 
more or less in passing in the DELORS Report (points 35-38) would gain considerably in significance. 
Community policy must adjust to this role in good time. The public - and in particular economic and 
social groups-should be made aware of  the new possibilities accruing from the Community's respon-
sibilities worldwide (cf. points 1.4.2., 1.4.3. and 3.3.4.). This applies firstly to external trade policy 
proper, for which the Community is responsible according to the EEC  Treaty and for which the 
Commission represents the Member States as their spokesman in the GA  TI  negotiations. It applies· 
also in general to the ability of the Community to improve relations between the industrialized and 
the developing countries and to contribute through the importance of its internal market and open 
trading system to progress towards a more liberal world trade system. 
The Steps towards EMU 
Economic and Monetary Union needs careful preparation, particularly since tax changes and the 
establishment of  a single market for capital movements and bank and financial services can have consi-
derable repercussions on exchange-rate relationships, which have remained relatively stable in recent 
years: 
- The Community-wide freedom of movement for bank and financial services will mean that when 
there is free movement of  capital (points 12 and 24) the currency area of  a central bank will no longer 
largely coincide (as has usually been the case) with the area in which its currency is used and its 
banking system operates. 
- The abolition of  currency restrictions in respect of  capital movements (points 12 and 14) will remove 
a shield that has materially helped a number of Member States to protect-the exchange rate of  their 
currency for a fairly long time even when inflation has been relatively high. 
- The abolition of tax barriers with a view to the closer alignment or approximation of tax systems 
may in the transitional period also create new competition parameters, which lead to changes in 
the flows of goods and funds and bring pressure to bear on exchange rates. 3. 1. 1. 
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- The effects of Economic and Monetary Union on social insurance systems -whose scale and funding 
needs to be carefully scrutinized - will create additional parameters. 
The experiences with these and other changes in parameters determined by integration form an 
important basis for additional support measures in the run-up to monetary union. Here exchange rates 
still have an important equalizing function. It is therefore understandable that some Member States 
have had reservations about submitting to the constraints of  the EMS exchange rate mechanism. This 
applies to the hesitation shown in the case of  the pound sterling, which is still subject to  special pressures 
as a world currency, and to the use of a larger fluctuation margin of 6% for the lira and the peseta, 
following the courageous decision to make the latter a full member of the EMS. 
The negotiations on the participation of all EC currencies in the exchange rate mechanism of  the EMS 
on the same conditions show -like the debate concerning the Commission's proposals for tax directives 
-that  the basic preconditions for Economic and Monetary Union-and especially for the (irrevocable) 
renunciation of changes in exchange rates- have still not been fulfilled. 
Progress towards monetary union thus cannot be made overhastily or in accordance with a precise 
timetable but calls for well-considered steps. It  seems inappropriate to schedule all the steps in advance 
in a three-phase plan as the DELORS Report does (point 40 et seq.). It  would be easier to reach political 
agreement beforehand on a treaty laying down the conditions for the final stage of EMU provided that 
no commitments are made to transfer powers to the European Communities-the implications of  which 
cannot yet be assessed- on fixed dates. The fate of the 1971  WERNER plan shows that publicly 
announcing the stages of  a plan and then subsequently cancelling them can have a detrimental effect 
on the complicated and delicate preparations for monetary union. 
It would therefore be more realistic to speak of a preparatory period, which would certainly extend 
more than three or four years beyond completion of the internal market. After a short start-up period, 
which will be needed for the formal agreements, the actual integration process of Economic and 
Monetary Union could follow immediately. The steps assigned to the second stage in the DELORS 
Report would thus have to be switched to the preparatory period. This would avoid the problems 
mentioned in point 3.3.2. of having an ESCB without any powers of its own initially. 
The preparatory period would be determined in particular by completion of  the internal market, which 
will require considerable economic and social adjustments and restructuring and may lead to consi-
derable capital movements in varying directions. It is not possible to lay down a multi-stage schedule 
for these adjustments. 
The coordination of economic and monetary policy (point 50) must therefore be stepped up in the 
preparatory period on the basis of directives and go far beyond what was provided for in the 1974 
convergence decision and in the 1964 decision on the terms of reference of the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors, cf. the ESC Opinions on the Commission proposals of 13 October 1989 for Council 
decisions on the convergence of  economic performance during stage one of EMU (  COM(89) 466 final) 
and on cooperation between the central banks of the Member States (COM(89) 467 final). 
Approval is given to the idea put  forward in the DELORS Report (point 51) that the Council of Economics 
and  Finance Ministers should assess economic trends in  the Community on the basis of agreed 
indicators and national reviews and come to an agreement on important economic policy targets. 
Precise recommendations should be made for fiscal policy in the Member States and particularly for 
financing public budget deficits. 
The Committee of Central Bank Governors should not merely be consulted in advance on national 
monetary policy decisions and  report to the European  Parliament and  European  Council on the 
monetary situation in the Community. Instead it  should switch early on to proposing monetary policy 
guidelines (point 57). These could include in particular the setting of  a joint money supply target with 
a relatively wide margin of fluctuation at the outset. The margin could be gradually narrowed on the 
basis of  an "interpretative money supply policy" and a six-monthly review of  the money supply target. 
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The Committee could also begin framing a common monetary policy, taking account of the higher 
degree of integration of the money and capital markets (point 57), the impact of financial innovation 
and the development of banking centres. A start could also be made on aligning the monetary policy 
mechanisms (in particular minimum reserves and bank rate and open market policies). 
Part of  the Member States' currency reserves- around 10% -could be used by the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors for currency market interventions- particularly vis-a-vis non-Community currencies 
- in accordance with joint guidelines. Member States could grant each other drawing rights for this 
purpose. The disadvantages of  an established European Reserve Fund referred to in point 3.3.1. would 
thus be avoided. 
To ensure binding decision-making within the Committee of  Central Bank Governors, an attempt should 
be made to give national central banks before long the same degree of autonomy as the ESCB is to 
have. At  the same time legislation should be passed at national level- and later for the ESCB -stipulating 
that there is to be no inflationary financing of public budget deficits by unlimited central bank loans. 
As part of  the preparations it is essential that all EC currencies be incorporated into the EMS exchange 
rate mechanism. In the preparatory stage, provision for exchange rate adjustments should not only 
be retained, but used in line ~ith the adjustment pressures generated by the implementation of the 
internal market, without this being dramatized as an "unusual situation". The pressures caused by 
the implementation of the internal market in connection with the freeing of capital movements will 
in any event not permit the maintenance of incorrect currency parities which lead to new imbalances. 
It does not seem appropriate, in addition to the joint market intervention described in point 3.2.5., 
to establish an independent European Reserve Fund (point 53) with its own Board of Directors and 
permanent staff. 
An independent Community reserve fund would anticipate the ESCB and would require an amendment 
to the Treaty in  advance.  A  coordinated intervention policy by the Committee of Central  Bank 
Governors seems moreover more appropriate (point 54) than the provision of a "training ground" for 
a new institution designed to pave the way for the ESCB. 
The arguments against the advance establishment of a European Reserve Fund militate even more 
so against the premature establishment of  the European System of Central Banks (point 57). It  would 
be  wrong to introduce the ESCB  as a type of learning process, before the monetary union was 
established. In these circumstances, the ESCB would have a hybrid role: 
- it would exist de facto and de jure with all its trappings, including the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors which is to be incorporated into it, and its sub-committees and staff; 
- on the other hand, the monetary policy decisions which would be publicly assigned to the ESCB, 
and expected from it, would continue to be taken, implemented and justified at national level. 
An ESCB without real powers would be regarded as a sham because the material prerequisites for 
its successful operation would still be lacking. This would be detrimental to this extremely important 
monetary union institution and the joint monetary policy to be decided and answered for by it. The 
learning process provided for in the DELORS  Report in a second (intermediary) phase should be 
mastered in the preparatory stage, i.e. in a longer initial phase. It  should take place exclusively within 
existing institutions, such  as  the Committee of Central  Bank Governors,  subject to appropriate 
extension of their terms of reference. 
An intermediate stage should be avoided, not  only as regards the precursors of the ESCB, but also 
as regards a parallel currency. Approval is given to the reservations expressed in the DELORS Report 
(point 47) as regards an independent European currency which would be additional to the Community 
currencies and compete with them to a certain extent. Such a parallel currency would considerably 
complicate the coordination of  national monetary policies in the crucial"learning stage". It  would also 
require additional legal arrangements which would hamper the preparations for monetary union. 3.3.4. 
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- This additional currency, even if it could be largely created step-by-step by the sale or withdrawal 
of  national currency, would also generate some additional money and credit and would run counter 
to efforts to achieve greater price stability. 
- These risks and hazards far outweigh the possible benefits of  the expected acceleration of  progress 
towards monetary union. 
- A parallel currency would also do nothing to enhance the prestige on which a subsequent common 
ECU-currencywitl depend. GRESHAM's law would apply, i.e. such a parallel currency would tend 
to either drive out national currencies or be driven out by them, depending on whether it  was looked 
on as relatively "good" or "bad". 
On the other hand the private use of the ECU (in the existing form of a basket of currencies) should 
not be impeded (point 49) - in fact it should be encouraged to an even greater extent. Above all, 
Community payments should be in ECUs and ECUs should also be permitted - alongside national 
currencies-for public tenders at Community level, for the payments of  taxes and levies and for corporate 
balance sheets and accounts. The use of the ECU for balance sheets, for statistics, for fares - in 
particular by travel agents, airlines, railways, etc. - and for additional price indication would also make 
the ECU known and demonstrate its advantages. This would - as is already the case in many border 
areas- enable Community citizens to compare prices and get used to a "European" money. It would 
also  considerably assist the  subsequent switch-over when  monetary union  had  been  achieved 
-particularly in those countries where people have mentally got  used to handling monetary units running 
into thousands or tens of thousands. 
The tasks described in Chapter 2 (Final Stage) would be taken over in one go by the Economic and 
Monetary Union to be implemented by a special treaty. On establishment, the ESCB would immediately 
take over all powers, in particular the responsibility for the common monetary policy and for the adminis-
tration of the pooled currency reserves.  For the participating currencies which by definition would 
be linked by irrevocably fixed parities, the ESCB would prepare the transition to a uniform European 
currency (ECU). 
All EC Member States might not be capable of completing the transition to Economic and Monetary 
Union simultaneously, because some of them may still have to adjust their exchange rates. 
The launching of EMU should not be determined by the pace of the Member State lagging furthest 
behind in the monetary development process. Those Member States which, because of  their degree 
of convergence, are not likely to adjust the exchange rates for their respective currencies any more 
(a point already reached by  some EMS members), should be able as a stable monetary area to launch 
the EMU amongst themselves and to transfer the agreed sovereignty rights to it. 
The non-membership of one or other Member State would undoubtedly create certain institutional 
problems for EMU, particularly in connection with Community institutions such as the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament. Pending full membership, consideration could be given to 
granting these countries observer status, with limited voting rights, within the ESCB. 
It would however be preferable- and a realistic prospect after an intensive preparatory period- for 
all EC States to form the Economic and Monetary Union simultaneously. 
Done at Brussels, 19 October 1989 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
The Secretary-General 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Jacques MOREAU 
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23 On 22 October 1989 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of  the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the attainment of  progressive convergence of  economic 
performance during stage one of  Economic and Monetary Union 
(COM(89J 466 final) 
and the 
Recommendation for a Council Decision  amending Decision 64/300/EEC on cooperation 
between the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community 
(COM(89J 467 final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's 
work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 7 November 1989. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN, the Co-
Rapporteur Mr DRAGO. 
At its 271st Plenary Session (meeting of 16 November 1989) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion by a very large majority, with two abstentions: 
*  *  * 
I.  PROPOSAL  FOR  A  COUNCIL  DECISION  ON  THE  AnAINMENT OF  PROGRESSIVE 
CONVERGENCE OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING STAGE ONE OF ECONOMIC 
AND MONETARY UNION 
1.  General comments 
1 . 1 .  The Economic and Social Committee welcomes the Proposal for a Council Decision on the attainment 
of progressive convergence of economic performance during stage one of Economic and Monetary 
Union (COM(89) 466 final of 13.10.1989). 
1. 2.  On various occasions the Committee has called for a revision of the-Council Decision of 18.02.1974 
on the attainment of a high degree of convergence of economic policies, because this Decision has 
hardly been applied in practice(11• 
1 . 3 .  A higher degree of convergence of economic development and improved coordination of economic 
policy would seem more necessary than ever in the light of  the completion of the internal market and 
the commitment to begin the first stage of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 July 1990. 
1 . 4.  The first stage of Economic and Monetary Union will only be successful if greater compatibility of 
economic performance and closer coordination of  economic policy are achieved. To this end the draft 
Decision proposes that the Council undertake multilateral surveillance by means of indicators, country 
reports and annual economic reports, and issue policy recommendations on the basis of  this surveil-
lance; this is a step in the right direction. Regrettably no provision is made, however, in this procedure 
for the involvement of the College of  Commissioners in the preparation of  the multilateral surveillance. 
1 . 5 .  The Committee assumes that the proposed Decision will be further supplemented and refined on the 
basis of  experience acquired in the first phase of Economic and Monetary Union. The Decision raises 
various questions and misgivings for the ESC which are set out below. 
(1)  See in particular the Committee's Opinion on the Commission's 1988/89 Annual Economic Report, OJ  No. C 23 of 23.01.1989. 
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2 . 1 .  The various committees which have carried out such sterling work over recent years are to participate 
in different ways in the preparations for the multilateral surveillance by the Council of Economic and 
Finance Ministers; specific tasks are assigned to  the Monetary Committee by  Article 3, to  the Economic 
Policy Committee by Article 5 and to the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks by Article 8. 
It is regrettable that the Economic Policy Committee is given a lesser role to play than the Monetary 
Committee; under Article 11 (  1) the former would appear to relinquish the specific tasks in the coordi-
nation of  economic policy which were assigned to it  in 1974 and which are relevant to the preparation 
of  the multilateral surveillance by the Council. Equally regrettable is the repeal, without replacement, 
of the Directive of 18.02.1974 on stability, growth and full employment in the Community. 
It  would seem sensible to coordinate closely the role of  these three committees in the multilateral surveil-
lance and to set up a joint secretariat for this purpose in the Commission's Directorate-General II 
(Economic and Financial Affairs). In this connection the role of  the Coordination Group -which legally 
still exists- should be examined. 
2. 2.  It is right that the Chairman of the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers should make public 
the results of its deliberations, as provided for in Article 2 of  the proposed Decision, although the multi-
lateral surveillance itself is to be undertaken in restricted sessions. If the multilateral surveillance is 
actually to result in compatible economic policies by  way of  mutual commitments, the support is needed 
not only of  the ministers attending the Council meeting, but also of  their home governments and indeed 
a much wider circle of those involved in and responsible for policymaking. This presupposes that the 
relevant information is provided in a suitable way. In order to develop broadly based support for such 
economic policies, the Economic and Social Committee should be informed -along with the European, 
national and regional parliaments as laid down in Article 9- of the results of multilateral surveillance. 
2 . 3 .  The multilateral surveillance is to be undertaken by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
on the basis of reports and analysis submitted by the Commission. According-to Article 3 of  the Decision 
these are to include trend reports (presumably quarterly), country reports and an annual economic 
report. Article 4 specifically states that the annual economic report is to be adopted by the Council 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation of  the European Parliament and Economic 
and Social Committee. In this connection an effort  should be made through the annual economic report, 
with respect to the major indicators, to provide guidelines which could form a practical basis for the 
current multilateral surveillance. 
The country reports could serve as a basis at national level too for the dialogue between social and 
economic interest groups provided for in the Single European Act. As the ESC has already been doing 
this for years on its own initiative, the procedure could be improved if the country reports drawn up 
by the Commission were, just like the annual economic report, forwarded to the ESC for its Opinion 
before being referred to the Council. In the case of  the country reports, particular consideration should 
be given to the problems of regional and structural adjustment. 
In this connection the Committee regrets that the repeal of Directive 74/121 /EEC of 18 February 1974 
means that its Article 3 is also revoked; this provided for consultation with the representatives of the 
most important economic and social groups on basic economic policy. This provision should be reincor-
porated. 
2 . 4 .  The mutililateral surveillance must be undertaken in rstricted sessions since the discussions are of a 
confidential nature. On the other hand, in the interests of democratic accountability, it would be 
preferable not only for the mutually agreed commitments to be made public (  cf. point 2.2.), but also 
for use to be made of the possibility of issuing policy recommendations as provided for in Article 2 
of the proposed Decision. Even if they were not formally binding in the first phase of Economic and 
Monetary Union, such recommendations would confirm the mutual commitments. 
2 . 5 .  It  would further be  advisable to  set  deadlines for  compliance with the recommendations and to  empower 
the Commission to monitor compliance with the recommendations and any mutually agreed deadlines. 
The Commission reports to the Council on the progress made in multilateral surveillance (Article 10) 
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should also report on compliance with the recommendations. These reports should be transmitted 
to national and regional parliaments and to the ESC, as well as to the European Parliament. 
The preparation of the Council's work on multilateral surveillance as entrusted to the Monetary 
Committee under Article 3 should include general aspects of budgetary policy. With regard to the 
coordination of economic policy, the Economic Policy Committee, in the interests of parallelism of 
monetary and economic policy, should be involved in the preparation of  the multilateral surveillance. 
The multilateral surveillance provided for in Article 5 should if possible include the national budgets 
over the whole year. This surveillance would be facilitated if  agreement were reached at Commmunity 
level to align dates for the preparation, submission and adoption of  the Member States' budgets, which 
at present fall between March and October  I November in most cases. The ESC wonders whether the 
experience acquired in the particularly close coordination of budgetary estimates resulting from Franco-
German economic consultation could prove useful here. 
In contrast to the Convergence Decision of 18.02.1974, the proposed Decision does not lay down a 
special procedure for exchange rate fluctuations. In the interval a less formal Community procedure 
has in fact come into operation which has proved its worth, because the convening of  a special meeting 
of the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers gives the exchange markets a clear signal that 
decisions on parity changes are expected. 
The argument put forward in point 2.8. regarding the effect of "special meetings" of the Council of 
Economic and Finance Ministers also applies to the procedure laid down in Article 7 of  the draft Decision 
when events outside the Community threaten serious consequences. The procedure proposed for 
such crises, i.e. that the Council, upon proposal by the Commission and after consultation of the 
Monetary Committee and possibly of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks, shall meet 
to consider possible measures, would seem too cumbersome and, in view of  the unavoidable publicity, 
unsuitable. It would be better for the appropriate bodies, in the crisis situations referred to in Article 
7, to coordinate their response in a manner in keeping with the confidentiality of the decisions to be 
taken. 
As  differences  in  the  demarcation  of powers and  responsibilities  between  central  banks  and 
governments in  the Member States persist, the ESC  supports the "better consistency between 
monetary and other economic policies" referred to in Article 8 of  the draft Decision. The participation 
of the Chairman of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks in Council meetings is a step 
in the right direction, as mapped out in the DELORS Report, towards future cooperation in the EMU 
between the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which is responsible for joint monetary policy, 
and the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers, which is responsible for the coordination of 
economic policy. 
Progress towards EMU is dependent on more than just encouraging support for economic policies 
through the multilateral surveillance procedure and the practical knowledge acquired in its implemen-
tation. It  is also dependent on the broad political agreement of  the general public and a better unders-
tanding of the consequences of EMU. With this in mind, the reports referred to in Articles 9 and 10 
of the draft Decision should be submitted not only to the European Parliament, but also to the Economic 
and Social Committee. 
RECOMMENDATION FOR A COUNCIL DECISION AMENDING DECISION 84/300/EEC ON 
COOPERATION  BETWEEN THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE  MEMBER STATES OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
Comments 
1 .  The Economic and Social Committee welcomes the Recommendation for a Council Decision amending 
the Decision of 8 May 1964 on cooperation between the Central Banks of the Member States. This 
amendment would seem opportune as the first stage of  Economic and Monetary Union is due to start 
27 on 1 July 1990, calling for greater convergence of economic performance towards non-inflationary 
growth and towards economic and social cohesion between the Member States. The ESC agrees that 
greater convergence should be promoted with a view to achieving domestic price stability, which is 
at  the same time a necessary condition for stable exchange rates, and that the formulation of monetary 
policy in an Economic and Monetary Union should provide for commitment to price stability, which 
is essential to the success of that Union. 
2 .  The exchange of  information provided for in Article 3(2) of  the amended Decision is self-evident. The 
same paragraph stipulates that the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks shall be consulted 
on national decisions concerning the course of monetary policy; this consultation must neither impede 
nor delay such decisions, especially the setting of annual domestic monetary or credit targets. The 
wording, that the Committee "shall normally be  consulted in advance", would therefore seem 
appropriate. 
3 .  The ESC would highlight the fourth recital of the draft Decision, to the effect that the Central Banks 
should be given more autonomy. This is advisable in that it would give all the Central Bank Chairmen 
on the Committee equal standing in the negotiations and joint  decisions. Such equality would facilitate 
the preparations for the setting-up of a European System of Central Banks which would, under the 
proposals contained in the DELORS Report (point 32), be independent. 
4 .  The annual report on the activities of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks and on the 
monetary and financial conditions in the Community (Article 3) should be transmitted to the national 
parliaments and the Economic and Social Committee, as well as to the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament. This should help ensure that  the general public, and in particular the economic 
and social interest groups, understand the need for a common monetary policy if progress is to be 
made towards Economic and Monetary Union. 
5 .  The tasks assigned to the Committee under Article 3 should also include a review of budgetary policy 
in view of its importance for promoting the coordination of monetary policies (Art. 3(3)), for formulating 
opinions on the overall orientation of monetary and exchange rate policy (Art. 3(4)), and for expressing 
opinions to individual governments and the Council of Ministers on the monetary situation and the 
functioning of the European Monetary System (Art. 3(5)). 
6 .  The ESC  expressly endorses Article 5 of the draft Decision which states that the Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks may create sub-committees and provide its own secretariat and 
research services. Such a structure, which exists in part already, would serve as a nucleus for  the future 
European System of Central Banks. 
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Done at Brussels, 16 November 1989. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
The Secretary-General 
of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Jacques MOREAU ADDITIONAL OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
Economic and Monetary Union 
29 On 19 November 1990 the Economic and Social Committee decided to draw up an Additional Opinion on economic 
and monetary union in the European Community. This Additional Opinion rounds off the ESC's Opinion of 19 
October 1989 (OJ C  329 of 30.12.89) on the Report on economic and monetary union in the Community (DELORS 
Report) and the ESC's Opinion of 16 November 1989 (OJ  C  56 of 7.3.1990) on (a) the proposal for a Council Decision 
on the convergence of economic performance and (b) the recommendation for a Council Decision on cooperation 
between the central banks of the Member States. The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, 
which was asked to carry out the preparatory work on the matter, adopted its Opinion on 12 February 1991. The 
Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 284th Plenary Session (meeting of 27 February 1991) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion by a large majority, with 6 abstentions: 
* 
1.  General Comments 
Major progress was made in 1990 towards economic and monetary union: 
The first stage began on 1 July 1990. The second stage will begin on 1  January 1994 if  the necessary 
conditions have been fulfilled. A decision is due to be taken before 1997 on the beginning of the third 
stage. 
The liberalization of capital movements took effect on 1 July 1990 ·although in some areas it had been 
achieved even earlier-and the multilateral surveillance of  the convergence of  economic performances 
has got under way. 
Further currencies have joined the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System: the 
peseta on 19 June 1989 and pound sterling on 8 October 1990. Both currencies will initially be allowed 
to fluctuate within a band of 6%.1n the case of the lira the margin was narrowed to 2.25% on 7 January 
1990. 
On 23 July 1990 the Monetary Committee of the European Community submitted a report entitled 
"Orientations for the Preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference". 
On 27 November 1990 the Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks, under the Chairmanship 
of Mr Karl Otto POEHL, presented the Draft Statutes of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
together with an introductory report and a commentary. 
On 21 August 1990 the Commission of  the European Communities submitted a report on the objectives, 
principles, consequences and institutional aspects of economic and monetary union (SEC 90/1659 
fin); in October 1990 the Commission also submitted a comprehensive report on the benefits and costs 
of economic and  monetary union ("One market,  one  money") and  on  10  December proposed 
amendments to the EC Treaty (SEC(90)  2500). 
The intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union, convened by the Heads of State 
or Government in October 1990, began its deliberations on 14 December 1990 alongside an intergo-
vernmental conference devoted to the political dimension of the European Communities. On 8 January 
1991 the British presented to the intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union 
new proposals for a common European currency, the so-called "hard ECU". The Spanish submitted 
their own proposals on 24 January 1991. 
Although such progress is welcomed by the Economic and Social Committee it cannot obscure the 
fact that there are still considerable objections and doubts to be overcome. These are described in 
the paragraphs below. 
The political will to submit national economic and social policies and particularly budgetary policies 
to the constraints of common economic policy guidelines and the requirements of a common monetary 
policy aimed at achieving price stability, does not yet seem to exist everywhere, especially since any 
such action would be seen in many Member States as a loss of sovereignty. Some Member States 
believe that far-reaching economic convergence would require greater Community powers than those 
taking shape in the intergovernmental conference on political union. 
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There are still wide variations in Inflation rates, notably between currencies which have long been 
in the narrow band of the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS, and the others. (Inflation rates in 
October 1990 are as follows: OK: 2.7%; NL: 2.9%; 0: 3.3%; IRL:  3.5%; F: 3.8%; L: 4.2%; 8: 4.3%; 1: 
6.8%; E: 7.1%; GB: 10.0%; P: 14.4%; GR: 22.3%). 
Some Member State budget deficits which continue to be financed by central bank borrowing can 
only be successfully tackled by addressing national resource allocation problems. 
There are some reservations about stipulating under the Treaty that general price-level stability is 
the priority of the monetary policy of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB). At a more general 
level commentators are wondering in some Member States whether it is at all possible to have a 
common monetary policy embracing twelve countries and aimed at achieving general price-level 
stability when there is no tangible proof either that the economic policies of the twelve different 
countries can actually be subordinated to common guidelines or that the national measures deemed 
necessary to successfully overcome unemployment, structural weaknesses and regional imbalances 
are in fact compatible with the common goal of general price-level stability. 
In some Member States there are reservations about whether the independence of a European Central 
Bank should be guaranteed under the Treaty, whilst other Member States wonder how far such 
independence would be compatible with democratic accountability to the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament. 
Finally, it is unclear who would have responsibility in a monetary union for the common exchange· 
rate policy vis-a-vis third countries: the Council of Ministers following agreement with the ESCB, or 
the ESCB alone. 
These objections and doubts are largely unknown to the wider public in the majority of Member States. 
The discussion of  economic and monetary union options is often over-simplified and frequently limited 
to the question of timing and institutional arrangements. However, given the importance of the 
decisions to be taken, pari iamentary bodies, economic and social organizations and the social partners 
such as are represented on the Economic and Social Committee, should be involved in discussions 
at an early date and the ESC should itself be consulted. 
The Commission report on the benefits and costs of monetary union is not a document which would 
easily win over the general public. The benefits of monetary union cannot be measured solely in terms 
of the disappearance of exchange costs and currency risks; at least as important, though naturally 
hard to quantify, are the benefits of easier price comparison in the whole of the Community, and the 
use of a single currency as the visible expression of  the economic and political cohesion of the Member 
States. The benefits of the international role of a European currency destined to become a major world 
currency alongside the US dollar and the yen are also not easy to evaluate. Thus far, the importance 
of the Community in monetary terms has not been felt. Approximately 60% of the world's foreign 
exchange reserves are held in US dollars and less than a quarter in OM and £s. The US economy is 
also at a great advantage not only because trade can be conducted in US dollars within the USA, but 
also because America's import-export trade is denominated in dollars in many parts of the world. In 
Europe, by contrast, not even the Airbus can be sold in a European currency even though several 
European countries are jointly involved in its development and construction. 
The advantages of monetary union nevertheless have to be weighed against a number of disadvan-
tages which are not explained clearly enough in the Commission's report. Most workers and ordinary 
members of the public-and to some extent even politicians and entrepreneurs-are unaware of these 
disadvantages which concern (a)  the abandonment of parity adjustments as an instrument for fine-
tuning economic policy, (b)  the abandonment of national monetary policies, and therefore national 
policies on interest rates and minimum reserves, and finally (c) major changes in financial policy to 
avoid future central bank financing of excessive budget deficits, a move which would be painful for 
many countries. 
The consequences of economic and monetary union deserve to be  better known and should be 
discussed more openly and not just in the intergovernmental conference. The economic, budgetary 
and social policy constraints which would flow from a common monetary policy geared to the principle 
of general price-level stability have not, for example, been discussed with sufficient openness and 
clarity in the proposals awaiting a decision at the intergovernmental conference. This is true for 
example of wage policy, which would have to be linked in all Member States to productivity gains, 
as well as social policy in general, which would no longer be financed by inflationary increases in the money supply, i.e.  by central bank financing of budget deficits. Some of these aspects are 
discussed in more detail in Parts 2 and 3 of this Opinion. 
Leaving aside the comments on certain aspects of monetary, economic and budgetary policies, the 
Economic and Social Committee basically supports the proposed path to economic and monetary 
union, as laid out in the DELORS report and described in greatest detail subsequently. 
The model of economic and monetary union is approved since it is a logical further step along the 
road to European integration. Together with the completion of the Single Market in 1992, it will serve 
as a model for closer economic integration for the whole of Europe. The European Commission must 
nevertheless boldly and unambiguously address itself to the constraints on economic and particu-
larly social policy which will arise as progress is made towards economic and monetary union. 
If, for political and other reasons, economic and monetary union is to be achieved soon, i.e. by the 
year 2,000, then transitional arrangements for a certain number of Member States should be in place 
by the beginning of the third stage. Under these transitional arrangements only a core of particularly 
stable currencies and not all twelve currencies would have to be immediately linked to each other 
by irrevocably fixed exchange rates. Accordingly, currencies still requiring exchange-rate adjustments 
could one by one become "full" members of the monetary system after the beginning of the third stage. 
2.  Comments on Monetary Policy 
The advantages of monetary union, including full price comparison and the disappearance of exchange 
costs, can only be fully exploited when there are irrevocably fixed exchange rates between currencies 
participating in the ERM and when 'these fixed exchange rates are finally replaced by a single European 
currency. There are powerful economic and political reasons in reality why this further step should 
be taken. For political reasons, such a single European currency could not be one of the existing 
national  currencies.  The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  therefore  welcomes  the  European 
Commission's proposal that the EEC Treaty be amended to eventually provide for a single currency 
in the Community. On page 41 of this Opinion examines the issues surrounding the step-by-step intro-
duction of a single European currency. 
Full monetary union, as is planned for the third stage, necessitates a uniform money and credit policy. 
In a uniform monetary area, subsidiarity (the partial reliance on national monetary policy) will be out 
of the question. The ESC therefore approves the creation of a European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) in accordance with the concrete proposals of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks. 
The ESCB would be set up at the beginning of the second stage and at the beginning of the third stage 
would have full and sole responsibility for monetary policy and for control over the European money 
supply. 
The aims of a common European monetary policy, and the responsibilities of the ESCB therefore, 
must be laid down in the EEC Treaty. 
Monetary union can only be  meaningfully based on elements which have made the Community 
attractive and ensured the European Monetary System's (EMS) success as an area of relative monetary 
stability. In accordance with the proposals of the EC Commission, the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks, the ESC therefore approves the newly proposed Article 
3(g)(a) of the EEC Treaty which states that price stability is a primary objective of the ESCB. The 
frequently misunderstood concept of price stability (or more correctly general price-level stability or 
stable monetary value) could accordingly be spelt out in the newly proposed Article 106(a)(1) of the 
EEC Treaty as referring to the concept of "purchasing power not eroded yearly by inflationary increases 
in the money supply". 
At the same time it should be made clear that the ESCB supports an economic policy based on common 
guidelines for the Community, provided general price-level stability is not adversely affected. The ESCB 
cannot therefore be forced to find solutions to conflicting economic policy objectives at the expense 
of general price-level stability. 
Finally, and in accordance with the proposals referred to above, it should be made clear in the newly 
proposed Articles 3(g)(a) and 106(a) of the EEC Treaty that the ESCB cannot be forced to finance public 
sector deficits through central bank lending. This would not in any way be in conflict with the fact 
that the ESCB is allowed to engage in public lending operations as part of its open market and liquidity 
policy. 
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It is intended to make monetary policy the exclusive responsibility of the ESCB. This needs to be 
clarified since in most Member States of the Community monetary policy is not the exclusive respon-
sibility of central banks so that any changes in the situation would be far-reaching and problematic. 
The status of the ECB as an independent institution with mandatory requirements to consult and report 
should be laid down clearly in the EEC Treaty. 
Experience suggests that general price-level stability can only be guaranteed if the ESCB does not 
have to take political instructions from national governments or Community institutions. Institutional, 
operational and personal independence must therefore all be guaranteed. Personal independence 
would itself be protected by the procedure laid down under the newly proposed Article 107(3) of the 
EEC Treaty whereby all the members of the Executive Board are to be appointed by the European 
Council, after consultations with the European Parliament, for a period of eight years. It would not 
be an infringement of personal independence if members of the Executive Board were precluded from 
serving for a second eight-year term of office. Such a measure would also make it easier to ensure 
the eventual appointment of Executive Board members from other countries not represented during 
the first or second terms of office. The appointment of staff and high-ranking officials of the European 
Central  Bank should also reflect the need  for a balanced representation of specialists from all 
Community Member States. 
The independence of the ESCB would moreover only be guaranteed if individual national central banks 
had a comparable status of independence in performing functions within the federal structure of the 
ESCB. This point is dealt with in the newly proposed Article 106a, second paragraph, of the EEC Treaty. 
The independence of national central banks is also required under the proposed voting procedure 
in the Council of the ESCB. According to this procedure, every Governor of a national bank would 
have one vote, as would members of the Executive Board appointed by the European Council. 
Whilst the Economic and Social Committee supports an independent ESCB free from political instruc-
tions, it is also aware of the need to clarify the procedure by which it has to report to the European 
Council and the European Parliament. The participation of European Commission and Council repre-
sentatives (without voting rights) in the meetings of the ESCB Council, which is responsible for the 
formulation of European monetary policy, should accordingly be regulated by Treaty. 
The  Committee approves the obligation to present a Report,  as  proposed by the Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks and the European Commission and enshrined in the newly proposed 
Art. 109(4) of the EEC Treaty. The new provision stipulating that the European Parliament shall hold 
a debate on the conduct of economic and monetary policy, on the basis of the annual report of the 
ESCB and with the participation of the President of the ESCB (newly proposed Art. 109(5) of the EEC 
Treaty), is welcomed. The Monetary Committee's additional recommendation that "public opinion" 
be given "regular explanations" of the "broad lines of ESCB policy" should be set out in even greater 
detail. To this end it would help if not only the European Parliament but also the Economic and Social 
Committee of the European Communities were given the possibility of holding a debate on the annual 
report of the ESCB, with the participation of the latter's President. 
The Economic and Social Council of the Netherlands (SER) confirms that the Central Bank Consul-
tative Council of the "Netherlands Bank" is an effective body. The Council in question, which is 
appointed by the Crown, consults the economic and social groups represented on it even though the 
latter have no say in the decisions taken. The possibility of setting up a similar Consultative Council 
for the ESCB should therefore be looked into. 
The newly proposed Article 173 of the EEC Treaty which allows recourse to the European Court of 
Justice where legal acts of the ESCB are concerned, reflects the democratic accountability of the 
ESCB. It should also be made clear, perhaps in the parallel negotiations of the intergovernmental 
conference on political union, who exactly should be given the right to appeal to the European Court 
of Justice against decisions of the ESCB. 
The homogeneity of the ESCB's monetary policy must not be undermined by the failure to distinguish 
clearly between the powers of the European Central Bank and the powers of the national central banks. 
It should therefore be made absolutely clear that in the context of monetary union, the European 
Central Bank alone takes decisions on the use of domestic and external monetary-policy instruments 
to influence the money supply and regulate the supply of credit, and alone controls the foreign 
exchange reserve assets transferred to it on behalf of the Community (newly proposed Article 108(2) 
of the EEC Treaty). National central banks would be represented on the Council of the European Central Bank by their 
respective Governors, and would thus be involved in the ECB Council's decision-making, but under 
the newly proposed Article 107(1) of the EEC Treaty they would have no independent domestic and 
external monetary policy powers in their own country. Their primary task would rather be to execute 
at national level the European Central Bank policies to which they contribute. 
National central banks would also have to carry out duties which are not explicitly assigned to the 
European Central Bank (proposed ESCB statutes, Art. 22 and Art. 25). These include duties in the 
clearing and payment system, as well as perhaps banking supervision insofar as this latter function 
is not entrusted to specific state supervisory authorities. The European Central Bank could itself be 
assigned the task of coordinating cooperation between national banking supervisory authorities 
responsible for monitoring the activities (including international activities) of credit institutions 
established on their territory. This is the principle of "surveillance in the country of establishment". 
On the basis of the comment on Article 14 in the report of the Committee of Governors of the Central 
Banks it would appear that most of the national central banks agree with this distribution of functions 
although this is not yet the case with the governments of some Member States. 
The division of responsibilities within the Council of the ECB between the Executive Board members 
(who would be responsible for daily management) and the Governors of the national central banks 
should be clarified in the newly proposed Art. 107(6) of the EEC Treaty and Article 12 of the Draft 
Statutes of the ESCB. The same applies to the delegation of certain powers by the Council of the 
Central Bank to the Executive Board members (provided for under the newly proposed Art. 107(8) of 
the EC Treaty). 
Responsibilities for the exchange-rate policy vis-a-vis third countries within the context of fu II monetary 
union must also be clarified in advance. 
Decisions on changes in exchange-rate parities generally lie with governments and not central banks. 
The Committee of Governors of the Central Banks has therefore realistically recommended that 
decisions on the "exchange rate regime" of a European monetary union and the exchange-rate policy 
vis-a-vis third country currencies be left with the political authorities, i.e. the ECOFIN Council, although 
the European Central  Bank would be  consulted beforehand. The  European Commission rightly 
considers it important that the exchange rate policy should be defined within the framework of close 
cooperation between the ECB and the ECOFIN Council. 
However it will no longer be merely a question of taking decisions of principle on external monetary 
policy, as was the case with previous changes of parities or of pivotal rates in the European Monetary 
System. In future, given the persistence of fluctuating, "flexible" exchange rates internationally, it 
will be more a question of deciding the daily intervention policy for the single European currency on 
the world's foreign-exchange markets. Pursuant to the newly proposed Art 108(1) of the EEC Treaty, 
this task should lie in the hands of the European Central Bank, if need be in accordance with the 
guidelines for a longerNterm common exchange-rate policy vis-a-vis the US dollar and Japanese yen, 
as laid down periodically by the ECOFIN Council. At any event the external monetary policy should 
be compatible with the ESCB's general monetary policy based on price-level stability. 
Finally, a clear decision should be taken on who would represent the European Central Bank System 
(ESCB) in international monetary institutions and conferences. 
The Economic and Social Committee regards as adequate the newly proposed Article 108(3) of the 
EEC Treaty whereby the ESCB shall be represented in the group of leading industrial nations (G7) 
by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), together with the President of the ECOFIN 
Council and a member of the European Commission. 
With regard to international monetary cooperation, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks 
would leave open the question of whether national central banks belonging to the ESCB should be 
able as now to conclude agreements with central banks from third countries and also, for instance, 
remain members of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel in an individual capacity. 
If accepted, such arrangements might weaken the role which an ESCB with a single monetary policy 
and ultimately a single European currency would be expected to play on the international stage. On 
the other hand, given the federative character of the ESCB, this rule would appear to be justified since, 
in accordance with the newly proposed Article 106(2) of the EEC Treaty, national central banks retain 
their legal personality under national law, whereas only the ECB acquires legal personality under inter-
national law. 
35 The voting procedures to be used when monetary policy decisions are taken by the Council of the 
European Central Bank should be clarified from the outset. 
Monetary policy decisions should be adopted in the ESCB by a simple majority. This means that 
members of the European Central Bank's Council, i.e. the six members of the Executive Board and 
the Governors of the national central banks, would each have one vote. Differing from the line taken 
in its earlier Opinion (OJ  C  329 of 30.12.1989, point 2.4.4.) on weighted voting, the ESC supports the 
single vote arrangement since it satisfies the requirement to apply monetary policy decisions to the 
Community as a whole, whilst making due allowance for national considerations. 
Weighted voting would consequently be allowed only in the case of financial decisions (capital of 
the ECB, transfer of foreign reserve assets, allocation of profits, etc.). 
3.  Comments on Economic and Budgetary Policy 
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Monetary union  is unthinkable without economic union; there must even  be  a large degree of 
parallelism between the two. 
A common monetary policy can only underpin national economic policies if the latter are focused 
on common objectives and are compatible with the principle of general price-level stability. Economic 
policies aimed at achieving overall parallel development do not require a new European institution 
along the lines of the ESCB set up to regulate monetary policy. 
While there can only be one monetary policy, each Member State has some room for manoeuvre 
regarding economic policy. In pursuance of the general objectives of the EEC Treaty (old Articles 2 
and 104), Member States may take individual initiatives and bring into play different instruments in 
accordance with their own particular circumstances and traditions. In economic pol icy the principle 
of subsidiarity therefore applies. This means that European-level action is not needed if measures 
can be taken as effectively or more effectively at national or regional level. 
Economic policy cooperation must be  intensified and deepened and national economic policies 
closely coordinated if economic development is to follow and maintain a generally parallel course 
in the Community despite national autonomy in economic policy-making. The role of the Council of 
economic and financial ministers, and hence the role of the European Commission, must accordingly 
be strengthened. The ECOFIN Council could thus become a counterpart (including an institutional 
counterpart) to the European System of Central Banks in ensuring the parallelism of economic and 
monetary union. This economic policy counterpart to monetary policy does not mean that decisions 
of the ESCB would have to receive the blessing of the ECOFIN Council or that the latter would have 
the last word in cases of conflict. Any conflict between monetary and economic policy would have 
to be avoided by permanent coordination between the two bodies. Public opinion might certainly also 
have a role to play here. In the case of major conflicts (e.g. contradiction between general price-level 
stability and exchange-rate adjustments vis-a-vis third currencies), an unanimous vote of no confidence 
in the ESCB by the ECOFIN Council might possibly be envisaged. 
The common monetary policy of the ESCB (based on general price-level stability) and the economic 
policy coordination work carried out by the ECOFIN Council (geared to achievement of the goal of 
economic convergence) must be continually brought in line with one another. This would require the 
participation of ECB representatives, on the one hand, and representatives of the ECOFIN Council, 
the European Council and the European Commission, on the other, at each other's meetings, though 
without voting rights. The proposals made in this connection (newly proposed Articles 107(3) and 109(1) 
of the EEC Treaty and Articles 15(1) and 15(2) of the Draft Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks) are approved. The task of securing alignment between a common monetary policy on the one 
hand, and coordinated economic policies based on common guidelines on the other, would be made 
easier if an update of the current state of interconnections between the two policies were provided 
on the basis of the continuous two-way flow of information between the bodies of the ESCB and the 
ECOFIN Council. 
It is vital for coordination in economic and budgetary policy matters that the Council of Ministers 
reaches agreement on common economic policy guidelines and objectives. 
Without a consensus on such economic policy guidelines it is impossible to guarantee the economic 
convergence required for monetary union as well as the compatibility of national economic policies 
required for economic union. However, the use of a rigid system of planned targets in conjunction with the economic policy 
guidelines should be avoided; instead whenever general economic conditions change-and occasio-
nally they change very rapidly- it should be possible to make a swift revision of economic policy 
guidelines and targets. 
The economic reform programmes of the structurally weaker Member States will need to be given 
support if they are to attain the requisite convergence. This should be reflected in the Community's 
own economic policy guidelines. A decision has already been taken by the Community to tackle 
structural weaknesses by transferring resources from its increased structural funds, the sums involved 
amounting to 3-5%  of the gross domestic product of the countries in  question. The structural 
weaknesses of some Member States' economies should also receive attention during re-examination 
of the reform of the structural funds at the end of 1991
1 and revision of the medium-term financial 
prospects (1993-1997) during the first half of 1992, as well as in the Community's industrial policy. 
In  this area of industrial policy the European Commission presented its new "Guidelines for a 
Community approach" (COM(90) 566 final), on 16 November 1990, a communication on which the 
Economic and Social Committee is currently preparing an Opinion. 
Given their vital importance, common economic policy guidelines must be drawn up with great care. 
The preparatory stage should include consultations with economic and social interest groups. 
If the ECOFIN Council, as a European body with no supporting framework of its own, is to play its 
role in harmonizing and coordinating economic policies, then the European Commission must be put 
in a position where it can take the necessary steps to prepare the decisions of the Council of Ministers 
and ensure the on-going surveillance of economic convergence. It will therefore be necessary to 
strengthen further the multilateral surveillance launched in the second half of 1990 and involving all 
economic policy aspects of importance to the Community (price and cost trends; competitiveness; 
employment; regional development; public budgets). 
Each year the Commission should establish economic policy guidelines which would be based on 
an assessment of economic performance in the Member States and would have to be acted on by 
the ECOFIN Council and the European Council in accordance with procedures to be laid down under 
the newly proposed Article 102c of the EEC Treaty. These guidelines would be expected to refer speci-
fically to finance policy, labour market policy and structural policy in order to ensure the compati-
bility of Member States' economic policies. 
When the pi uri-annual economic policy guidelines covering three to five years are laid down, it would 
appear advisable to consult not only the European Parliament but also the Economic and Social 
Committee. The ESC should also be informed of the results of the multilateral surveillance just as 
European, national and regional parliaments are (ct.  OJ  C  56 of 7.3.1990, point 2.2.). 
Furthermore, the ESC should be consulted on the country reports, which are to be prepared by the 
Commission for the ECOFIN Council for the purpose of multilateral surveillance. This consultation 
of the ESC would hopefully ensure broad-based economic policy-making and a dialogue between 
economic and social interest groups in the interests of greater economic policy convergence and 
public support therefor (ct. OJ  C  56 of 7.3.1990, points 2.2. and 2.3.). 
The multilateral surveillance of economic and budgetary policies should encompass developments 
on the finance markets, including relations with capital markets outside the Community. The free 
movement of capital between Community and non-Community countries should also be regulated 
clearly when Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty are revised. 
The implementation of economic policy adjustments considered necessary on the basis of multila-
teral surveillance will be of crucial importance for the coordination of economic policies based on 
common guidelines. 
The question is whether such adjustments could be made in the Council of Ministers as a result of 
"confidential peer-group pressure" or whether the formal recommendations and public declarations 
made on the proposal of the Commission alone will achieve this end. The best way of overcoming 
economic difficulties and making economic policy adjustments would be via the newly proposed 
Article 104(1) of the EEC  Treaty on  the granting of special financial support subject to certain 
conditions. 
See Article 19 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88 of the Council of 24 June 1988. 
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The Monetary Committee is even contemplating sanctions, which would involve the suspension of 
payments from the Community budget and recourse to the European Court of Justice. Agreement 
would have to be reached before the start of the second stage on the scope for such sanctions and 
the form they would take. 
The Economic and Social Committee endorses the Commission's view that the role of the Community 
should be strengthened in policy areas with a major European-wide impact. 
Areas of European-wide importance include in particular competition policy; trade policy; research 
and development; European-wide infrastructure, especially in connection with regional policy; environ-
mental protection; and some aspects of taxation. 
A particularly important policy area stems from the desire to ensure that the Community is economi-
cally and socially cohesive. Of special importance here is incomes policy. Responsibility for fixing 
wages and salaries must, as now, remain in the hands of the two sides of industry (cf. OJ  C  329 of 
30.12.1989,  points 2.8.2.  and 2.8.3.).  In conjunction with collective wage bargaining however the 
Community should also assume its responsibilities for improving labour market mobility as well as 
education and training schemes. 
It needs to be made clear how Community policy can be substantially strengthened in the above areas 
which transcend the immediate remit of the ECOFIN Council. The strengthening of Community policy 
is one of the aspects of economic and monetary union which are linked to the Communities' "political 
dimension"; this matter will consequently have to be discussed by the concurrent intergovernmental 
conference on political union. 
The inclusion of budgetary policies is of crucial importance if economic policies are to be success-
fully coordinated. The Committee shares the Monetary Committee's view that efforts should not be 
confined to the monitoring of budget deficits. Other aspects of budgetary policy should also be 
coordinated and an appropriate budgetary stance defined for the Community as a whole. The budget 
of the European Communities might be able to play an increasingly important role here. 
The Committee shares the Commission's views that the existence and financing of excessive budget 
deficits must be viewed and judged according to how it affects a common monetary policy geared 
to general price-level stability. 
At least two fundamental rules for budgetary policy should be embodied in the EEC Treaty: firstly 
there should be no "monetary" financing of public "deficits", i.e. no central bank loans or privileged 
access to the money markets for the public authorities, and secondly no Member State should be 
able to benefit from an unconditional guarantee concerning its public debt either from the Community 
or from another Member State. 
How "excessive budget deficit" or "excessive" public debt is defined in accordance with European-
wide criteria should also be clarified. Suitable yardsticks would include the relationship between 
budget deficit/public debt and average gross domestic product over a number of years. Another 
acceptable guideline would be to apply the "golden rule" of public finance, namely that the budget 
deficit should not exceed public investment expenditure. However, the expediency of including such 
criteria in a Council Directive on multilateral surveillance is open to debate. The Monetary Committee's 
concerns on this matter are shared. 
At all events the budgetary policy situation should be assessed in conjunction with overall economic 
developments. Only in this way will it be possible to take into account unusual circumstances such 
as the exceptional funds temporarily needed by the Federal Republic of Germany to support redeve-
lopment in the new Lander. 
It is to be regretted that only slow progress has been made so far towards the fiscal harmonization 
required for the completion of the internal market. The Commission rightly points out that the 
competitive pressures stemming from tax differences will intensify in economic union. This is parti-
cularly true of persistent differences in the taxation of capital investment income which will have 
increasingly powerful effects in a monetary union with free movement of capital and no exchange-
rate risks. 4.  Comments on the Second Stage and on Transitional Arrangements for  the Common Currency in the 
Third Stage 
From the political standpoint, there are many reasons for a rapid transition to complete monetary 
union, i.e. for a brief second stage. According to the European Council decision of 28 October 1990, 
this second stage would begin on 1 January 1994 provided the necessary conditions had been fulfilled. 
There can therefore be nothing automatic about transition to the second stage. 
Politically, the desire to enter the final, irreversible stage of monetary union after a brief second stage 
is understandable given the desire to exploit the dynamics of the completion of the single market 
and the expectations aroused by German unification and events in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, a more sober economic appraisal suggests that progress towards convergent economic 
performance (essential to complete monetary union) has been achieved only by longNestablished 
participants in the EMS exchange-rate mechanism. The three to seven times higher inflation rates 
in the other Member States mean that the conditions for complete monetary integration clearly cannot 
be fulfilled so quickly. 
Finally, institutionally, there remains a great deal to be done to strengthen the role of the Community 
institutions if, after a short second stage, they are to rapidly perform the functions assigned to them 
within the context of full economic and monetary union. 
The continuing absence of economic convergence in the Community as a whole derives from structural 
weaknesses in some Member States. These structural weaknesses will be even more apparent in the 
next few years with the completion of the internal market, especially if there are to be cyclical 
downturns or economic setbacks caused by political crises. 
In the short term (i.e. during the second stage of economic and monetary union if it turns out to be 
short) these weaknesses cannot be completely eliminated either by closer economic cooperation or 
by financial assistance from the Community structural funds, for which increased resources should 
nevertheless be allocated. Rigorous economic policy programmes and implementation of the decision 
already taken to "transfer substantial resources" from the Community's increased structural funds, 
will however ensure that these countries' economies are more convergent with those of the rest of 
the  Community. The  last two European  currencies to remain  outside the  EMS  exchange rate 
mechanism, the escudo and the drachma, might also be able to join before the beginning of the second 
stage. The inclusion of all twelve currencies in the exchange rate mechanism before 1994 should not 
however lead to the conclusion that adjustments of pivotal rates can then be abandoned. 
The ESC takes the view (OJ C 329 of 30.12.1989, point 3.2.7.) that the structurally weaker Member States 
should continue to rely on exchange rate adjustments for as long as possible as a means of dealing 
with adjustment pressures; these  pressures,  resulting  from  completion of the  internal  market 
accompanied by the free movement of capital, rule out the retention of obsolete currency parities 
which would create new imbalances. 
Because of the high level of economic interdependence in the Community, the use of exchange rate 
adjustments as an instrument of economic policy has an immediate effect on all prices and incomes. 
Since 1987,  however, no use has been made of exchange rate adjustments within the European 
Monetary System even though inflation rates have varied. The exchange rate stability described here 
can nevertheless not conceal the fact that some of these currencies are under pressure on the foreign 
exchange markets. Such exchange rate stability in no way guarantees that there will be no changes 
in pivotal rates either before 1994 or during the "short" second stage or that we shall then be on the 
threshold of a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates. 
During the first eight years after the introduction of the exchange rate mechanism in 1979 there were 
eleven adjustments of pivotal rates. A wider band for currency fluctuations (6% instead of 2.25%) 
was and still is needed by several EC currencies. But despite this uneven participation in the exchange 
rate mechanism there has been no talk of a two-speed Europe. Instead there have been words of praise 
for this "monetary area of relative stability" and its "disciplining effect" on the Community as a whole. 
This past experience should be taken into account when deciding whether or not the second stage 
should be brief and when working on the transitional arrangements which need to be made for some 
Member States at the beginning of the third stage. 
The need for and characteristics of an intermediate second stage have still not been convincingly 
and clearly described (OJ C 329 of 30.12.1989, point 3.3.3.). 
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Many believe that an  intermediate second stage could be of short duration. On  the other hand, 
economic and monetary cooperation should be so intensified that "over  a period" the required degree 
of budgetary discipline and general price-level stability would be observed. This at least is what the 
Monetary Committee believes. 
A short second stage would be helpful for the ESCB. The ESCB should be established at the beginning 
of  the second stage, although national authorities should initially retain individual responsibility for 
monetary policy. The ESC has already drawn attention (OJ  C 329 of 30.12.1989, point 3.3.2.) to the 
damage which would be done to the ESCB's Image if it remained without monetary powers for any 
length of time or, in the words of the Monetary Committee, if it were to be "set up as an empty shell". 
The ECB should therefore be consulted from the outset on all decisions still taken by the national 
central  banks  and  should  have  the  task of promoting the  harmonization  of monetaryNpolicy 
instruments. The legal framework for ESCB activities provided for by the newly proposed Article 1  09d 
(3) of the EEC Treaty (for exam pie, with regard to mini  mum reserves and obi igatory reports by the credit 
institutions) would have to be set up without delay. 
During the second stage the European Central Bank would have to turn its attention to finding suitable 
ways of promoting the private and public use of the ECU (cf.  OJ C 329 of  30.12.1989, point 3.3.4.). The 
ECU would be used more widely (means of payment, unit of account, balance-sheets, statistics, tariffs 
and fares, pricing) if it were "hardened" through a redefinition of the currency basket. The Spanish 
have proposed that this should be achieved by fixing the exchange rate of the ECU against those 
currencies which do not suffer devaluations and by redefining the composition and weighting of the 
ECU currency basket whenever pivotal rates are adjusted within the exchange-rate mechanism. The 
permanent pegging of the ECU to the stable currencies of the European Community would mean a 
move away from a basket of currencies with a fluctuating value to one with a fixed value. This would 
facilitate the later third and last stage, namely the transition from the ECU  currency basket to a 
common European currency which would be issued by the ESCB in the form of banknotes and coins. 
The shortness or length of the second stage will depend on a future political decision as to whether 
all the relevant conditions, i.e. the convergence of economic development, must first be satisfied by 
all twelve Member States or whether some are already in a position to enter into full monetary union. 
A monetary union based on irrevocably fixed exchange rates could not comprise all twelve Member 
States from the outset if for political reasons it had to be established quickly. Such a step would entail 
considerable risks for general price-level stability if economic and monetary policy were aimed at 
an attainable "average convergence", involving a correspondingly higher rate of Community inflation. 
A further danger would be the urgent need for com  pen sa  tory public funding to assist the structurally 
weaker Member States. 
Together with the assistance provided by the Community's structural funds, such compensatory 
financing would have to be on a considerable scale since countries still structurally weaker could 
no longer continue to offset their lack of competitiveness by exchange rate adjustments. These 
countries, however, are dependent on such adjustments owing to a lack of labour mobility and low 
wage flexibility. 
The transfers necessitated by an early abandonment of exchange rate adjustments as an instrument 
of economic policy would impose a considerable economic burden on the Community and its capital 
market, as well as being politically unpopular. This assessment is confirmed by the experience of 
a similar financial transfer between the "richer" and "poorer" Lander of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
The earlier monetary union is established with irrevocably fixed exchange rates, the greater the need 
to introduce transitional arrangements for certain Member States at the start of this third and final 
stage (OJ C 329 of 30.12.1989, point 3.4.2.). This would no more give rise to a two-speed Europe, than 
has hitherto been the case with the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. 
A transitional provision could be included in the newly proposed Article 109g allowing Member States 
which are still dependent on exchange rate adjustments to initially remain outside the irrevocably 
fixed exchange-rate system, just as certain currencies only joined the EMS exchange-rate mechanism 
at a later date (or had still not joined by the beginning of 1991). 
An initial group of five to eight stable currencies would provide a considerable incentive for the other 
Member States of the Community to eventually join. Such a group of  stable currencies already exists, de facto, in the exchange-rate mechanism where there is a hard core of currencies forming an area 
of non-fluctuating exchange rates and thus serving to some extent as a forerunner of monetary union. 
This would seem to be a more promising approach than a precipitate admission of all Member States 
to the irrevocably fixed exchange rate system with the risk of a complete failure of the monetary union 
with all its adverse consequences for the process of European integration. 
The arrangements outlined on page 40 could be combined with elements of the British and Spanish 
proposals on the introduction of a "hard ECU". 
A "hard" ECU could be issued through the European System of Central Banks and would circulate 
in all Member States as a common currency. With the ECU,  as well as the creation of an  ESCB 
responsible for a common monetary policy, a decisive step would have been taken on the road to 
monetary union. 
A "hard ECU" would exist insofar as its value would no longer be determined by the previously defined 
basket of currencies but by a fixed, unchanging exchange relationship to the stable Community 
currencies bound to one another by irrevocably fixed exchange rates. 
In countries whose currencies were linked to one another by irrevocably fixed exchange rates the ECU 
could soon become the sole currency by replacing the national currency.ln the other Member States 
the ECU would continue to circulate in parallel with the national currency whose exchange rate might 
sti  II be able to change vis-a-vis the ECU. The ECU would thus become an externally visible link between 
the core countries of monetary union and those Member States whose currencies were not yet locked 
into the system by irrevocably fixed exchange rates. 
The ECU would therefore not be an additional, thirteenth currency, but a common European currency 
in accordance with the proposals of the European Commission and the Governors of the Central Banks. 
The latter do not believe however that the new common currency, the ECU,  will replace national 
currencies overnight but consider that national currencies will remain in circulation for some time. 
During this transitional period the ECU would be used, alongside national currencies, as legal tender 
throughout Europe. 
The ECU might accordingly be introduced over three stages: 
-With its introduction through the European System of Central Banks, the ECU would, during the 
transitional stage, be brought into circulation alongside national currencies in all twelve Member 
States. During this period the ECU would be in a fixed exchange relationship with "core country" 
currencies, whose exchange rates would be irrevocably fixed against each other and the ECU, whilst 
exchange rate adjustments would be allowed in the other Member States. 
- During the second stage the ECU could initially become the single currency in the core countries 
referred to in the first indent whilst circulating in parallel with national currencies in the other 
Member States. 
- Finally, during the third stage, the ECU would become the single currency in all countries of the 
Community, i.e. there would no longer be any national currencies in circulation in any of the Member 
States. 
During the transitional period, those national currencies which were allowed to opt out of the system 
and were not immediately and irrevocably pegged to the ECU, might in some areas be used more and 
in other areas less than the ECU. Gresham's sixteenth century law whereby "bad money drives out 
good" if both are legal tender would be partly vindicated and partly rebutted. This is the price which 
would have to be paid by the dual system, in addition to the difficulties facing the ESCB when pursuing 
a common monetary policy that had to accommodate European currencies whose exchange rates 
were not yet irreversibly fixed. 
Thus before long the ECU might develop into a "key" European currency to which currencies of other 
European countries (e.g. the Austrian schilling and Norwegian krone) could be pegged under more 
or less the same arrangements as before. Even currencies of non-European countries, previously based 
on the franc or pound sterling, might join in. The ECU would take on this role of a "key" currency 
because it would be underpinned not by some new European Fund but by the authority and potential 
of the European System of Central Banks. As a "key" European currency the ECU would be just as 
vulnerable to world monetary system upheavals as the dollar, yen, OM and£  sterling are now.lt would 
also be the object of speculation on the world's foreign exchange markets. On the other hand the 
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European Community would be able to make a bigger contribution than before to improving the inter-
national monetary order by its presence in international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund because the ECU would then have an important and increasingly influential role to 
play. There might of course be a tendency to overvalue the ECU on the world's foreign exchange 
markets, with the result that Community exports to third countries might be dearer and harder to find 
markets for, but this problem could be tackled within the framework of a common exchange-rate policy 
vis-a-vis currencies of third countries. 
With their central banks all Member States should participate in the work of the ESCB, the latter being 
responsible for regulating the ECU  money supply and formulating a common monetary policy. 
Adjustments of the pivotal rates of currencies not linked by irrevocably fixed parities would have to 
be decided by the governments concerned in agreement with the ESCB and the ECOFIN Council. 
With all Member States (a) coordinating their economic and budgetary policies (including the multi-
lateral surveillance thereof) and (b) participating in the ESCB and its common monetary policy, further 
progress towards the convergence of economies could be made in the third stage (and not in a brief 
second stage) and after a core of particularly stable EC currencies had adopted irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates, thereby attaining "full" monetary union. 
The ECU would be used increasingly as a parallel currency, both in countries where an exchange-
rate risk existed vis-a-vis the national currency and in the "core countries" of the monetary union where 
no such risk would exist. The wider acceptability of the ECU would also be promoted by its use as 
a loan currency. Industry and the general public throughout the Community would thus become more 
and more familiar with the ECU, a process which would be helped if  prices as well as wages and salaries 
were denominated in both currencies during the period when the ECU circulated in parallel with the 
national currency. 
The ECU could become the sole European currency once all the national currencies had joined the 
stable-currency group, i.e. when their parities -after a transitional period for occasional exchange-
rate adjustments- were also irrevocably tied to the ECU. Individual currencies could join this group 
one after another and without any dramatic deadlines being set, as when currencies gradually joined 
the exchange rate mechanism. This would also satisfy the provision of the newly proposed Article 
109h(3) of the EEC Treaty stipulating that neither transition to irrevocably fixed exchange rates nor 
the introduction of the  ECU  can  be  prevented  by  individual  Member States  benefitting from 
derogations. 
Done at Brussels, 27 February 1991. 
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43 1.  General Comments 
The Economic and Social Committee welcomes the Discussion Paper on Making Payments in the 
Internal Market presented by the EC Commission (COM(90)  447  final of 26.9.90). 
The Committee appreciates the efforts made by the Commission to analyze the extensive field covered 
by payments. This issue is of capital importance to the achievement of the European Single Market. 
The  Committee supports the  EC  Commission's view that the further development of Europe's 
payments systems is an urgent need which should be met "to  the benefit of all of Europe's citizens" 
(point 84) in order to get closer to a single market in the field of payments. The justified concerns of 
payments systems' users (consumers) need to be taken into account in this context. Consumers are 
not solely concerned about the time and costs involved in making international payments; they are 
also concerned, above all, about the question of legal certainty. 
An  efficient and  reliable payments system  meeting  high quality standards is also of decisive 
importance to the successful implementation of the forthcoming Economic and Monetary Union, 
which will cement a market of European dimensions. All the different parties concerned- private 
customers, business enterprises, public bodies and not just the system operators-must, each in their 
own way, help to improve the payments system. 
For social, economic and historical reasons the various forms of payments have developed in different 
ways and to different extents in the Member States. The different payment instruments-cash, cheques 
and transfers (which can  in turn be  broken down into standing orders, direct debiting and card-
controlled payments at automated teller machines)- have different shares of the market in each 
country. This in turn explains the country-by-country differences as regards costs, time required for 
transactions, and the development of technology in the field of payments. 
For the European Community, diversity of channels and methods of payment represents a feature 
on which to build, but at the same time constitutes a tremendous challenge because of the existence 
of a multitude of languages, cultures and, for the time being, currencies. Even though electronic 
transfers are at the forefront of the further development of payments systems, users should continue 
to have a choice between the different instruments. In those States where such a choice does not 
yet exist, the range of payment instruments available could be broadened. 
Payment instruments are tailored to varying user requirements, in particular as regard the degree of 
urgency and security required in respect of occasional or regular payments. To meet these differing 
requirements payment instruments differ in speed and cost, especially in the field of cross frontier 
payments. Even in the case of extensive, cohesive markets such as the USA-which is characterized 
by one currency as well as one language- recent experience has shown that providing payment 
services which meet high standards of reliability and rapidity is a very expensive undertaking, the 
costs of which have to be met by the users of the system. 
In Europe the market has created a variety of solutions to meet payment needs. These various systems 
have encountered a steadily growing success, despite numerous administrative hindrances still 
existing in some Member States. 
Confidence should continue to be placed in the market as a driving force. The market has in the past 
produced solutions which alleviated many shortcomings caused by the coexistence of more and less 
readily usable currencies, as well as by the lack of progress in monetary cooperation between the 
Member States. Examples of such solutions are the Eurocheque Agreement and the use of VISA and 
Eurocard credit cards to obtain money from cash dispensers in several countries. 
The further development and improvement of payment services in Europe will be made much easier 
if governments and authorities establish the necessary preconditions for the implementation of 
Economic and Monetary Union. These preconditions include, in particular: the complete liberalization 
of cross-frontier money and  capital  transactions in  the four EC  Member States still claiming 
exemptions after 1 July 1990; the limitation or abolition of remaining notification requirements for 
credit institutions laid down in currency regulations; the incorporation of all EC currencies in the EMS's 
exchange-rate mechanism and the restriction of exchange-rate fluctuations to a 2.25% band. It is 
incumbent upon the Governments of the Member States to establish these preconditions. This is a 
task which cannot be left to market forces. 
Thanks to the completion of the internal market, the introduction of free movement of capital and 
the  approximation  of the  supervisory  provisions  relating  to credit  institutions,  the  European 
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must be paid from the outset to requirements in respect of payments to and from the other non-EC 
states in Europe. Further developments in the area of payments should involve, in particular, the EFTA 
countries in order to enable citizens everywhere to benefit from a homogeneous level of service that 
a market of European dimensions can provide. Such a step would lend support to the endeavours 
to establish a European Economic Area (EEA) and possibly contribute to the successful outcome of 
the EEA negotiations currently underway. 
Moreover, cross-border payment services should, by their very nature, be incorporated in an interna-
tional framework, going beyond the frontiers of the EC. 
A considerable volume of payments go to industrialized countries and trade partners outside Europe, 
particularly, for instance to the USA and Japan. The further development of the cross-frontier payment 
system in the EC must therefore be compatible with the structural requirements to be met by a bridge 
linking it with international worldwide payment systems. 
As a consequence the existence of overlapping EC, European and worldwide structures would not 
help reduce the cost of "non-Europe" in this field-one of the objectives of the payment services set 
out by the Commission in its Discussion Paper. The cost of payment services should, however, in 
the final analysis be borne by the user. 
2.  Specific Comments 
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The Discussion Paper focuses on "low  value -large volume" payments. In the interests of consumers, 
this area in  particular should be developed. There are, however, also "high value - low volume" 
payments. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) has developed 
an electronic transmission system- used primarily by business undertakings- for these payments. 
These two types of payments have some common requirements, one particular requirement being 
reliability. The way these forms of payments develop should be compatible but not necessarily follow 
the same pattern. 
The improvement of payment systems in Europe, and in the Community in particular, must not merely 
involve the development of one payment system. It must address a variety of payment instruments 
and the user should be able to select the instrument best tailored to his needs. 
The Commission states in the Discussion Paper that cross-frontier payment systems could be 
improved by inter-linking the Automated Clearing Houses (ACHs) (cfr. Section A, paragraphs 15 to 
18, and Section C, paragraphs 51 to 55). Linking ACHs offers a good chance of success. To establish 
these links it would be necessary to coordinate the different technologies and programming used. 
This should not, however, be the one and only solution, for the reasons set out above. 
The further development of the various payment instruments should be coordinated in such a way 
as to meet the needs and expectations of the market and the parties involved. The idea of  developing 
a single pan-European payment system would not be in line either with market trends or the general 
tendency towards less interventionist policies, and would impose uniformity  on the payment services. 
These payment services have been developed to meet the needs of their respective customers and 
markets by individual groups of credit institutions and even by individual credit institutions, working 
in competition with each other. 
The existence of only one payment system would put an end to the comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of individual credit institutions and groups of banks which stem from their organizational 
and customer structures (e.g. the density of their network of branches; the number of correspondent 
banks and bases abroad; the concentration on bulk business, large multinationals or small and 
medium-sized enterprises; the number of cash dispensers; and the credit and charge cards issued). 
Market advantages are also gained from cooperation within the large European banking groups and 
from specific European initiatives in the field of payment transactions, such as those taken by savings 
banks within the framework of EUFISERV S.C. (access to 18,000 cash dispensers in 11  countries made 
available to 37 million cardholders and preparation of a European wide transfer system using the 
organization's own clearing houses and data-processing systems). The market advantages gained 
by customers of the one or  the other system or credit institution would be largely swept away if a single 
system were to be introduced. A single, somewhat monolithic payment system would have to cater 
equally for all conceivable payment transactions throughout Europe, be they for small or large sums 
and occasional or regular payments. Such a system would therefore be larger than was necessary 
to meet the needs of  a bulk payments system for consumers. The introduction of such a single system without any alternative would be like having a tourist traffic system based only on the use of aircraft 
and  airport feeder  services and  excluding rail  and  road  transport. The  inevitable reduction  in 
competition attendant upon such a development should be carefully considered if the aim is to 
establish a Single Market characterized by a high level of competition. The concept of a single payment 
system must also be examined from the point of view of compatibility with EC competition rules. 
The fullest possible competition combined with the necessary level of cooperation between competing 
credit institutions should be the maxim underlying every type of structure and every initiative aimed 
at improving financial services and, in particular, payment transactions in Europe. This is to be equated, 
the Committee thinks, with the right blend of competition and cooperation. No European-wide 
payments system is feasible without agreed cooperation between the credit institutions involved. 
The Eurocheque system provides a good example of how rival credit institutions are able to offer their 
customers a service throughout Europe, the very existence of which depends upon close cooperation 
in the offering of counter services, the issuing of cheques and cheque cards, the provision of clearing 
facilities and the observance of common rules. The Eurocheque System serving consumers (8,000 
credit institutions have issued 37 million Eurocheque guarantee cards) has made it possible for the 
first time for cheques drawn on the credit institutions concerned to be used throughout Europe- thanks 
to the payment guarantee incorporated in the system- up to a ceiling laid down for each currency. 
This system is made possible through the use of a uniform clearing procedure. The costs of the joint 
clearing operations, borne by the participating credit institutions, make it necessary to have uniform 
Eurocheque charges (currently 1.6% of the value of the cheque). On the other hand, credit institu-
tions have to bear differing burdens of work afld costs- a considerable burden is placed on banks 
in Southern European holiday destinations, whilst customers of banks in Northern Europe are the 
principal beneficiaries. In the derogation which it granted in 1984, in pursuance of Article  85(3) of 
the EEC Treaty, in respect of the Eurocheque Agreement the EC Commission made a distinction: the 
agreement on charges reached between credit institutions was regarded as an acceptable restriction 
of competition as it was a consequence of the system and the system benefitted the consumer, but 
there had to be competition between credit institutions as regards relations with customers. This 
means that every credit institution has the right to determine whether and to what extent it will pass 
on to its customers the uniform charges which it pays to the credit institution cashing its Eurocheques. 
In any consideration of the question of extending the Eurocheque system a distinction must be drawn 
between the requirements in respect of a) a common clearing procedure and b) guaranteed payment. 
The ceiling in  respect of the guaranteed payment of cheques (currently standing at  BEF  7,000, 
DKK  1,500, FRF 1,400 OEM 400, GAD 30,000, IEP 140, ITL 300,000, LUF 7,000, NLG 300, PTE 30,000, 
ESP 25,000, and GBP 100) has been determined in the light of the private use of Eurocheques, i.e. the 
risks to be borne by credit institutions for the majority of transactions and customers involved in such 
cases. If the use of Eurocheques were to be extended to business undertakings, the setting of a uniform 
-and possibly much higher-ceiling for payments would be out of the question because of the rapidly 
changing credit risks, which also differ from one undertaking to another. 
On the other hand, consideration should be given to extending the rapid and reliable clearing system 
to include Eurocheques for sums above the current ceiling. The inclusion of such cheques-for which 
payment would not be guaranteed- in the Eurocheque clearing system could be advantageous, in 
particular for small and medium-sized enterprises. Such an extension of the Eurocheque system must 
not, however, penalize the current private users of the system and, in particular must not therefore 
involve higher costs. 
The question of broadening access to the Eurocheque clearing system must therefore be carefully 
examined, taking account of consumer interests. The same applies to the possibility, considered in 
a study by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, of simplifying the payment of standar-
dized non-Eurocheques. 
The  Committee welcomes the consideration  being  given  by  the  ECU  Banking  Association,  in 
conjunction with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and the 
Bank for International Settlements, to extending the ECU·clearing system, particularly in respect of 
ECU cheques and in the light of the expected increase in payment transactions in ECUs (COM(90) 
447 final, Article 9, points 15 and 17). 
As  seen  by the users and  providers of payment services, the question of the balance between 
competition and cooperation has a direct impact on their mutual objective, namely the provision of 
rapid and reliable payment services at advantageous prices. 
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If all the different ways of making payments are developed into a single European-wide system this 
may eventually lead to the establishment of a single, standard procedure for transacting payments. 
However, the subscription to a foreign magazine and the payment of a deposit on a holiday at a foreign 
hotel do not have to meet the same requirements in terms of rapidity, reliability and security and do 
not have to be equally cost effective. 
The pricing of payment services can be tailored to the differing requirements as regards rapidity, 
reliability and security in such a way that it would meet the expectations of the Discussion Paper. 
What is meant by reasonable pricing can be assessed only to a certain point in relation to domestic 
payment  services  existing  hitherto within  Member States.  More  often  than  not,  the apparent 
reasonable level of domestic pricing was only made possible because of "combined costing". Under 
this combined costing the relatively higher costs of making payments were offset by relatively higher 
revenue from other fields. One example of such combined costing, which also involved non-financial 
services, was the operation, in a number of Member States of post-office banks, postal savings banks, 
and national giro banks before the separation of the various postal services. Differing national rates 
of interest on deposit accounts and, in particular, on sight deposits-a very costly operation in some 
cases for credit institutions, which in Italy, for example, pay out 8% -is a scenario which does not 
readily tie in with the Single Market, which was already depicted in the White Paper as an area in which 
the various operators compete healthily. 
Recent experience in the USA- a consolidated and integrated market using one language and one 
currency-demonstrates that there is a direct correlation between the efficiency of payment services 
and adequate and even substantial user pricing. 
Cross-frontier payments in Europe have hitherto frequently been complicated by administrative restric-
tions and impediments which entail a corresponding personnel outlay. These formalities and the 
statistical data to be passed on to the central banks have, therefore, made such payments within the 
EC more expensive than domestic payments. The total liberalization of financial transactions and 
capital movements, to which the Member States have committed themselves, will contribute to the 
improvement of cross-frontier payment services. 
Since payments represent, to a certain extent, the wheels of the economy, the feasibility studies 
envisaged by the Discussion Paper must firstly assess the direct impact each proposal would have. 
A more thorough investigation in this field would clearly be bound to identify the direct consequences 
in terms of levels of investment, the work involved, cost effectiveness, financing, employment and 
economic and monetary policies. 
Changes to the system of making payments would also affect other related areas which are part of 
everyday financial business. Take, for example, correspondent banking, which operates in virtually 
all areas of business (domestic and external payments and credit business) and is indeed a charac-
teristic feature of banking overall (COM(90) 447 final, Section A, 19). 
The Committee believes that, in the context of the further development of payment services in a 
European-wide market, the efforts of the various parties involved must continue to be encouraged. 
The financial industry should encourage the wide range of market initiatives aimed at improving 
payment services in a healthy competitive environment. Joint efforts in this area should aim at 
increasing the stability, integrity, security and reliability of the payment systems, using the appropriate 
technological developments available to the industry. 
The central banks and the bank supervisory authorities can play an important role in the development 
of payment systems, inter alia in connection with their responsibilities under EC regulatory provisions. 
As soon as it is established at the beginning of the second stage of European economic and monetary 
integration, the European Central Bank may also assume responsibilities with regard to the further 
development of payment systems. 
Progress towards more efficient payment services should not lead to the establishment of a two-speed 
Europe which would risk limiting the very objectives and scale that a European-wide market in the 
field of payment services should achieve. As a matter of principle all the parties involved should be 
in a position to participate in, and benefit from, the improvement of the payment services, though in reality this opportunity will of course be exploited initially by a group of "pioneers" who could, 
however, help the late-comers to catch up. 
Progress towards more efficient payment services could be made on several fronts. 
The necessary improvement of the European telecommunications infrastructure must be encouraged 
and pursued. This would pave the way for the creation of broad, multi-user financial highways (see 
the Commission's Communication to the Council on the Trans-European Networks-COM(90) 585 final). 
Due consideration must be given in this context to the significant increase in data transfers expected 
as a result of the extension of payment services. 
Parallel effort should be made in the area of standardization with a view to creating the necessary 
conditions for increasing the use of Electronic Data Interchange (ED I). A particularly important factor 
in this context would be the development of a uniform international bank identifier code system. 
There is a need for greater transparency as regards the conditions under which cross-border payments 
are made. The  involvement of all the different actors concerned should ensure that the various 
Commission Recommendations are systematically applied. The main Commission Recommenda-
tions are: 
- 90/109/EEC of 14 February 1990 on the transparency of transfer charges; 
- 88/590/EEC of 17 November 1988 on legal security in the use of payment cards. 
The three European associations of credit institutions, namely: 
-the  Banking Federation of the EEC, 
- the European Savings Banks Group, and 
- the Association of Cooperative Banks of the EEC, 
have discussed the Commission's Recommendation on payment systems amongst themselves and 
with consumer organizations and the Commission itself. These discussions led to the establishment 
on 14 November 1990 of the Code of Best Practice of the European Banking Industry on Card-Based 
Payment Systems. This Code takes into account several objectives, namely: 
- consumer protection in the EC in this field; 
- competition between the providers of services; 
- the provision of a choice of cards with different features for the benefit of the consumer. 
All credit institutions adhering to the Code of Best Practice could make this fact known to their 
customers in an appropriate way (e.g. through the use of a sign). 
Users of cross-frontier payment systems are not solely concerned about the cost of making payments 
and the time taken; they are also concerned about legal certainty and, in particular, the clarification 
of liability issues. Consumers must have legal certainty, particularly in the case of the theft, loss or 
misuse of credit and charge cards and in the case of misdirected or non-executed payment orders. 
To cover damage suffered by customers following, for example, the non-observance of payment 
transaction times,  comparable  legal  provisions should  be  sought in the field of cross-frontier 
payments. 
At national level, associations of credit institutions in eight States have, according to the Commission, 
established complaints bodies and/or arbitration bodies to deal with disputes in, inter alia, the field 
payments. Such bodies exist in Belgium, where the bank federation has introduced an ombudsman 
and  the  association  of savings  banks  has  established  a  settlement and  advisory committee 
(RBK/CROC). These bodies offer advice and provide consumers with a rapid, inexpensive and non-
bureaucratic procedure for reaching a decision or a settlement, without this excluding the possibility 
of recourse to the courts. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of establishing a form of 
complaints or arbitration body or an ombudsman at EC level, too. 
Efforts should also be made to acquaint users systematically with the particular features and costs 
of the various individual types of payment so that they could choose the one which was most advan-
tageous  and  best  met their needs.  Such  consumer guidance  would  require  a  corresponding 
commitment on the part of all the actors concerned· private and public bodies, financial industry, 
private users, governments, central banks and, last but not least, consumer associations and their 
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advice centres. A welcome contribution which could be made by credit institutions would be the 
provision of leaflets providing customers with information on the particular features, costs and 
transaction times of the various cross-frontier payment methods. 
With reference to the question of  customer guidance raised above, the advisory committee proposed 
by the EC Commission should consider the justified concern of consumers that the costs and terms 
of  different modes of payment should be .. ./  .. transparent. References to timetables which are respected 
in all but "exceptional circumstances" and to "reasonable" costs (Point 8 of  COM(90) 447) are unsatis-
factory for consumers. If banks were to provide their customers with scales of charges for different 
modes of payment, amounts, countries of destination, etc. and indicate the time usually required to 
transact payments, this would constitute a decisive step forwards towards the achievement of  trans· 
parency. Credit institutions usually already give a breakdown in invoices or bank statements of  cross-
frontier cheque and transfer costs, both for the payers and the payees. 
The Committee endorses the establishment of the Coordinating Group proposed in the Discussion 
Paper. In view of the purely advisory role of this Coordinating Group no problems are raised in the 
field of Committee procedures. Such a body would provide a useful forum for the exchange of 
information and experience, for receiving background information and seeking support from all 
involved in the development of payment services. Consumer organizations in particular, should be 
able to express their views and their concerns in such a forum. If  the Commission could provide parti-
cipants at coordinating group meetings with statistics on the various areas of  cross-frontier payments, 
this would be a welcome initiative. 
It would be advisable to set up two working parties to conduct deliberations 
- one in which representatives of consumers and perhaps also of wholesale trade, external trade, 
the tourist and hotel industries, etc., could meet experts from credit institutions, and 
- another in which the operators of  payment systems could examine technical possibilities, including 
the possibilities with regard to standardization. 
Further action in this area should be left to a smaller working party, comprising persons who, by virtue 
of their professional experience and position, have the requisite knowledge and authority to ensure 
that payment services operate effectively, with particular regard to the financial integrity of  the overall 
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